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INTRODUCTION 
The focus of this thesis is the impact that John Moors Cabot 
had on United States' relations with Latin America during his forty 
year career as a Foreign Service officer. It is not a biography, 
although some biographical information must naturally be included 
particularly if one is to understand the rationale underlying Cabot's 
stand on certain issues. It is also not a complete look at Cabot's 
career since he did spend part of that career in posts outside of 
Latin America. Although the amount of impact Cabot had on Latin 
American relations varied from time to time and from assignment to 
assignment, on several occasions, he had the opportunity to make a 
significant impact. He did not always succeed in gaining acceptance 
of his ideas, in fact, he spent much of his career in unsuccessful 
attempts to change accepted policies. Cabot's career peaked during 
the Eisenhower administration, when he was one of the first people 
to recognize that Washington's cold war policies toward Latin 
America were not effective and that by backing the traditional 
ruling classes and ignoring the need for social reform and economic 
development the United States was providing a "heaven-sent 
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opportunity" for communism to move into the area, the end the 
policies were designed to prevent.1 
Cabot's background provides few clues that he would 
become an outspoken advocate of aid for the underprivileged peoples 
of Latin America and a sharp critic of the Cold War consensus upon 
which Latin American policy was predicated. John Moors Cabot was 
born into one of the most distinguished families in the country on 
December 11, 1901. The Cabot name assumed importance in New 
England even before European settlement of the area when Cabot's 
namesake and forefather John Cabot sailed by the region and claimed 
it for England four hundred years before John Moors Cabot’s birth in 
Cambridge Massachusetts. The Cabot family had been producing 
leaders in politics and other fields since colonial times and John 
Moors Cabot grew up in such an exclusive society that it was said in 
Boston, "The Lodges speak only to the Cabots and the Cabots speak 
only to God." He attended the finest schools graduating from both 
Harvard (A.B., 1923) and Oxford (B.Litt., 1925) before entering the 
State Department's School of Foreign Service.2 
Cabot's career as a diplomat would eventually span four 
decades and take him to a variety of posts throughout the world, but 
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from his first years in the Foreign Service, Latin America was his 
area of expertise and he spent most of his career fighting for what 
he believed to be best for the United States and Latin American. His 
opinions often brought him into conflict with others in the 
government, and often his efforts appeared to be in vain. In the final 
analysis, however, he did have a positive and significant effect on 
the relations between the United States and Latin America. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. Cabot to Dr. Milton Eisenhower, 24 January 1958,The 
Diplomatic Papers of John Moors Cabot, hereafter cited as Cabot 
Papers (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1985) 
reel #2, folder 74. 
2. Drew Pearson, "A Cabot Talks to a Dictator", Washington 
Post, 13 May 1946, clipping in reel #1, folder 6, Cabot Papers . 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE EARLY YEARS: 1927-1940 
Cabot's professional career began in 1927, when after 
completing the State Department's School of Foreign Service, he 
received his first assignment as a vice-consul in Peru. Compared to 
the majority of his later assignments, Peru was exceedingly calm 
and uneventful. In his later recollections he equated Peru with 
Sunday drives and weekend explorations into the mountains. The 
political situation was relatively stable with dictator Augusto 
Leguia in power and no great diplomatic crises marred Peruvian - 
United States relations. Consequently, Cabot spent most of his time 
in Peru dealing with, "such prosaic matters as flea-bitten visa 
applicants and drunken sailors who had failed to make their ships."! 
The tranquility and even boredom of Peru, however, did not 
last long. In 1928, Cabot was transferred to the Dominican Republic 
where he would spend three eventful, exciting, and, at times, 
dangerous years. When Cabot arrived, the American Minister was 
Evan Young, "a remarkable man" from whom the young vice-consul had 
the "privilege to learn the trade of diplomacy." The "trade of 
6 
diplomacy" as Mr. Young taught it, included treating the people "on 
the basis of equality and friendship" talking with them about their 
concerns, and "being in close touch with all the leaders of all the 
parties." These were important lessons which Cabot learned well 
and used with much success throughout his career.2 
Cabot soon had the opportunity to implement his lessons, as 
Young took two months leave in the summer of 1929, and leaving in 
charge twenty-seven year old vice-consul. Although nothing 
dramatic happened during this time, he observed and assessed the 
challengingly complex political situation in the country. The current 
President, Horacio Vasquez whose term was to expire in 1930, and 
who legally was not eligible for reelection, was nevertheless 
maneuvering to stay in power. At the same time both Jose 
Alfonseca, the Vice-President, and Manuel De Moya, the Minister of 
Finance, had presidential aspirations, as did Estrella Urena, the 
leader of the opposition. To add to the instability, Rafael Trujillo, 
the head of the National Guard, was working behind the scenes to 
secure power for himself.3 
Although such rumors circulated throughout the summer and 
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fall, not until December did the legation acknowledge the possibility 
of an impending coup. President Vasquez had left for the United 
States to have surgery and it was greatly feared that in his absence, 
the government would be toppled. On two separate occasions during 
that month, Minister Young received "solemn promises" from Trujillo 
"that he would remain loyal to the government." At this juncture, 
Young was transferred to Bolivia and Cabot again became the charge 
d' affaires. Happily, Trujillo honored his pledge, no one else moved, 
and in early January, the President returned. The political situation 
seemingly had stabilized and Young's replacement, Charles Curtis 
arrived at the end of January.4 
In February, however, the long-rumored coup occurred, 
involving Cabot from the start. When the American legation in Santo 
Domingo received word that a coup was imminent, Cabot was sent to 
Santiago to meet with Urefia, the opposition leader who was rumored 
to be the leader of the coup. Cabot met with Erena, but was unable to 
get him to promise to delay action until negotiations could be held. 
On February 24, the day after Cabot's return from Santiago, President 
Vasquez and his cabinet arrived at the American Legation seeking 
asylum from rebels who had captured Santiago and several other 
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cities and were presumably on their way to Santo Domingo. Cabot 
and Curtis took Vasquez to see Trujillo, who the Americans 
suspected of being the real force behind the coup. Trujillo assured 
both the Americans and the President that he was not involved, and 
he obeyed the President's order to send out the Guard to meet the 
rebels. 
Soon the Americans received word that the "rebels" who were 
marching on the city were actually Guardsmen from Santiago dressed 
in civilian clothes. At this point, in an attempt to prevent bloodshed, 
the Americans convinced Vasquez to accede to the rebel's demands 
and provide assurances of a free election. Again Cabot was 
dispatched as a messenger to relay this proposal to Urena who 
remained in Santiago. This trip, of course, was much more difficult 
than Cabot's previous one because he was forced to pass through the 
two opposing armies who were advancing on one another. Cabot first 
caught up with the Guard that had been sent out by Trujillo. When he 
told the commander, Colonel Alfonseca the news of the possible 
compromise, he agreed to halt the march and await further 
developments. As it turned out, Alfonseca may have been easily 
persuaded to halt because he knew that Trujillo had given the column 
9 
only five rounds of ammunition per soldier, a fact unknown at the 
time to Cabot. Soon after leaving Alfonseca, Cabot reached the rebel 
column and after explaining that they were about to meet the Guard 
and that a possible compromise was in the works, they too were 
willing to hold up their advance. 
When Cabot finally arrived in Santiago and met with Ureha, he 
received some conditions to attach to the proposal, but a "generally 
favorable reply," and he set out on his return trip to Santo Domingo. 
On the way he again met the rebel column who despite the earlier 
agreement with Cabot, had decided to continue their march on Santo 
Domingo. Once again Cabot was able to persuade them to halt their 
advance and he went on to Santo Domingo. That night Vasquez agreed 
to the conditions, but being understandably skeptical of the rebel's 
promise not to advance, Cabot returned to the place he had left them 
earlier in the day. He found the camp abandoned and assumed 
correctly that they must be advancing on the city. What Cabot did 
not realize at the time was that Trujillo had recalled the National 
Guard and the rebels took the city virtually uncontested.5 
The Americans continued their participation as they helped 
the two parties to reach an accord in which Vasquez agreed to 
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relinquish power to Urefia who in turn was to supervise free 
elections in which neither Trujillo nor Vice President Alfonseca was 
to be a candidate. It was only after the successful coup that the 
Americans realized the full extent of Trujillo's role. Although he 
played out his part as loyal general right to the very end, he had in 
fact been planning to seize power for nearly a year. Not only had he 
given the National guard five rounds of ammunition per soldier and 
then recalled them before the rebels arrived, but he had also been 
responsible for arming the rebels by placing a large supply of the 
National Guard's rifles at their disposal. Trujillo had also staged the 
capture of Santiago with off-duty guardsmen "attacking" the fort 
with both sides firing harmlessly into the air giving the impression 
of a battle before the fort surrendered. 
Days after the takeover, Curtis sent Cabot to "read the riot 
act to Trujillo," and to tell him that "so far as we [U.S.] were 
concerned, we were through with him." According to Cabot's later 
recollections, after listening to a series of threats (which neither 
Cabot nor Curtis had been authorized to make) Trujillo "began to say 
that he would give up the whole political business." Before he could 
finish, however, Urefia entered the room and declared that he could 
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not govern without Trujillo, thus ending any chance Cabot had of 
ousting the ambitious young officer. In retrospect, it appears 
extremely doubtful that the threats of an inexperienced, young 
American diplomat could have possibly kept Trujillo from power. 
Nevertheless, years later after witnessing Trujillo's iron handed rule 
over the country, Cabot still claimed, "if it had not been for Estrella 
Urena's intervention I believe we would have succeeded."6 
Cabot's bold and courageous trips back and forth through 
enemy lines did not go unrecognized. The American press played up 
the incident with headlines like "BOSTON BOY HALTS NEAR 
REVOLUTION," and "[Cabot] RISKED LIFE TO EFFECT MEDIATION," and 
Cabot became somewhat of a minor celebrity for a time. Cabot's 
superiors in the State Department meanwhile issued a 
commendation and a promotion which moved him up two grades from 
an unclassified to class VIII Foreign Service Officer. To the 
President, the Secretary of State described Cabot's exploits in this 
way: 
Mr. Cabot was clearly exposed to very grave personal danger 
throughout the three days when he was almost continuously 
moving about through the areas where military operations were 
occurring, and I feel that he displayed notable courage and 
devotion to duty, as well as perseverance and judgment 
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throughout this trying period. The avoidance of serious 
bloodshed and the termination of the revolutionary uprising by 
mutual agreement were made possible to a very great extent by 
the judgment which he displayed in dealing with the rival 
revolutionary leaders.7 
The coup behind him, Cabot settled into the more routine 
diplomatic duties of observing developments and reporting them to 
Washington. The major occurrence was a violation of the 
compromise that Cabot had helped to effect. Trujillo decided to run 
in the presidential election in May, and with control of the military 
and with the opposition withdrawing as a protest against illegal 
electoral procedures, he was able to win an incredible landslide 
victory, actually amassing more votes than the total number of 
eligible voters. Although disappointed that a man they had tried to 
keep from power had been elected, the American Legation held out 
some hope for Trujillo's administration commenting that although he 
won the election "by thoroughly foul means ... He seems to have 
made an effort to conciliate the opposition and to obtain the 
cooperation of the Legation." Trujillo's repudiation of the February 
agreement not to run for president, plus his obviously corrupt 
election led the legation to question whether or not the United 
States would recognize the new dictator. Trujillo's rise to power 
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was certainly not a phenomenon for Latin America. Even Cabot who 
was no great fan of Trujillo admitted, "Elections controlled by 
Vasquez or his adherents would have been almost as bad as those 
later controlled by Trujillo."8 
The General Treaty of Peace and Amity of 1923, forbade 
diplomatic recognition of any government which came to power 
through a coup. Although the treaty was in effect, it had previously 
been ignored on several occasions and there is no evidence that non¬ 
recognition was ever seriously considered. Nevertheless, near the 
end of July, with Trujillo's inauguration only three weeks away, 
there was still no official word from Washington that Trujillo would 
be recognized. Minister Curtis was on leave owing to an illness so 
once again Cabot was in charge of the mission. On July 20, in a 
telegram to the Secretary of State, Cabot asked for permission "to 
publicly state that the Government of the United States has no 
intention of not recognizing Trujillo." Permission was granted to 
make the statement and Cabot immediately informed Trujillo and the 
press that the United States would be sending a special 
representative to Trujillo's inauguration and that the new leader 
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would be officially recognized.9 
In the ensuing years, as Trujillo became a ruthless dictator, 
many would accuse the Americans, and Cabot in particular of having 
put Trujillo into power. The only corroborative evidence is Cabot's 
telegram asking for an official statement of recognition. It should 
be pointed out, however, that this request was not an attempt to put 
Trujillo in power, but rather an attempt to stabilize the country by 
recognizing the fact that Trujillo was in power, and like it or not, 
there was nothing the United States could do, short of intervention, 
to change the situation. It should also be remembered that in 1929 
as rumors of a coup circulated in the country, it was the American 
Legation, at times headed by Cabot which had persuaded Trujillo to 
reaffirm his loyalty to the government. It was Curtis and Cabot who 
worked out the compromise that was designed to prevent Trujillo 
from running for office, and it was Cabot who through intimidation 
attempted to keep Trujillo out of power even after the successful 
coup. In fact, Cabot and the entire legation had done nearly 
everything within their limited authority to prevent Trujillo's 
victory. 
Given his anti-Trujillo record, Cabot could hardly remain an 
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effective diplomat in the country and he would soon exit the 
Dominican Republic. Prior to his transfer, however he participated in 
one other noteworthy incident. On the recommendation of Curtis, 
Cabot paid an informal call on General Desiderio Arias, an influential 
political figure. When he arrived Arias was in a "tense conversation 
with three other men." Upon seeing the American, the three men 
quickly left and Arias begged Cabot for asylum, claiming, "Trujillo 
sent those men to murder me." According to Cabot word soon spread 
that, "the American Legation had learned of Trujillo's plot and I had 
been sent to thwart it." The truth was, of course that Cabot's arrival 
was purely coincidental. Arias' fear was apparently well-founded as 
Trujillo had him killed less than two years later JO 
In the fall of 1930, Cabot finally took the leave which the 
various internal crises had delayed for nearly a year. He did briefly 
return to the Dominican Republic, but was reassigned to Mexico City 
in March 1931. Cabot's remaining prewar assignments could in no 
way compare with the excitement and danger of being in the middle 
of the Dominican coup. He got an opportunity, however, to serve in 
three more Latin American countries where he learned a great deal 
more about diplomacy and where he, in at least a few cases, had an 
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impact on Inter-American relations. 
During his brief assignment in Mexico City, Cabot had one 
unforgettable experience, albeit of a personal rather than a 
professional nature. On the day of his arrival, he met Elizabeth 
Lewis, the ambassador's social secretary. They courted throughout 
his year long tour of duty in Mexico and they were married on their 
return to the United States in the spring of 1932. With women's 
liberation still some years away, Mrs. Cabot carried out the 
traditional role of the diplomat's wife. She was expected to look and 
act appropriately, to host parties and to accompany her husband to 
various official and social functions. She did all of these things, but 
she also did much more. Having been born and raised in Mexico 
(although her parents were American citizens) she spoke fluent 
Spanish, and had a great appreciation for the people and culture of 
Mexico and of Latin America in general. She was well received and 
well liked by the press and the people whatever the diplomatic post. 
That she spoke Spanish and appreciated Latin American culture 
separated her from most of the wives of diplomats and many of the 
diplomats themselves. More important than her popularity and 
acceptance throughout the region, however, was the fact that her 
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intimate knowledge and appreciation of the area undoubtedly 
contributed to her husband's intellectual growth. This influence, 
helps to explain how a Boston Brahmin, wealthy and socially elite, 
with Harvard and Oxford educations, would eventually come truly to 
understand and sympathize with the problems facing the 
downtrodden in the underdeveloped counties of Latin America.11 
When the Cabots left for a European honeymoon, they shipped 
many of their belongings to Guatemala where upon his return, Cabot 
was scheduled to report. The day before their return he received new 
orders assigning him to Brazil not Guatemala. This sudden change of 
plans was something which would happen to the couple often in the 
following years. 
In Brazil Cabot furthered his diplomatic education, this time 
learning from Ambassador Edwin V. Morgan, "an extraordinary 
Ambassador" who "knew intimately everyone who counted in Brazil," 
and "could get almost anything done simply by asking the right 
person." Cabot would later recall "our relations with Brazil during 
his ambassadorship were as cordial as any I have seen between any 
two nations in the course of forty years' service." Unfortunately for 
Cabot and for the bilateral relations, Morgan was succeeded by an 
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ambassador who did not give "a damn for his post," and a charge who 
possessed both "an unfortunate tendency to drink too much" and an 
"uncontrollable temper."12 
In Brazil, with its relatively large embassy staff, Cabot 
enjoyed neither the responsibility nor the authority which were his 
in the Dominican Republic. Nevertheless, he did have the opportunity 
to observe and at times to play at least a minor role in American 
attempts to resolve several important diplomatic complications. 
The Chaco War broke out between Paraguay and Bolivia just after 
Cabot arrived in Brazil in the Summer of 1932. The role of the 
United States Embassy was primarily to act as a liaison between the 
State Department, which was attempting to end the bloodshed by 
encouraging the South American powers to intercede and the 
Brazilian government, which was actively attempting to settle the 
dispute. Despite efforts by the League of Nations, the neutral 
nations of the hemisphere, the neighboring countries, (Argentina, 
Brazil and Peru) and several individual countries, including the 
United States the war continued for the next three years and was 
finally settled only after, "the military belligerents had become 
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nationally exhausted."! 3 
Just as the Chaco War was heating up, in the summer of 
1932, another border dispute erupted, this one involving two of 
Brazil's northern neighbors. The Leticia dispute began in August 
when Peru attacked Colombia in an effort to regain land which it had 
ceded to Colombia in the Salomon-Lozano treaty in 1922. Once again, 
the United States and Brazil tried to end the conflict and prevent 
further bloodshed. The actual hostilities lasted only a few months, 
but with the major peace plan offered by Brazil and the peace talks 
continuing in Brazil for more than a year, the American Embassy was 
kept very busy monitoring progress and attempting to keep 
negotiations moving.! 4 
The border disputes adjacent to Brazil during Cabot's stay 
were not the only significant events which attracted attention. The 
Great Depression had nearly devastated Brazil's single-crop economy. 
By 1935, coffee exports were only one third of what they had been in 
1929.15 This sharp decline precipitated a enormous debt problem. 
The American Legation was involved in a series of negotiations 
which led to a restructuring and resumption of Brazilian foreign debt 
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payments.! 6 
Getulio Dortico Vargas had entrenched himself in power in 
1930 and the internal political situation appeared to be relatively 
stable. Ironically the two uprisings that did occur during Cabot's 
tour occurred just as he arrived and just as he was preparing to 
depart. In July 1932, only days after Cabot's arrival, General 
Bertaldo Klinger led a revolt and three years later there was a 
communist uprising one week before Cabot left the country for his 
next assignment. Vargas suppressed each of the uprisings and 
remained in power for nearly twenty years. This era ended in 1954 
when Vargas committed suicide, four years before Cabot's return to 
the country as United States Ambassador. Cabot was by no means a 
major participant in the diplomatic initiatives surrounding either 
the border disputes or the other issues with which the Embassy 
dealt. He was, nevertheless, present and he undoubtedly augmented 
his previous training in the field of Latin American diplomacy, 
something that would prove beneficial in later assignments. He also 
learned a great deal about Brazil and grew very fond of a country that 
he would later refer to as paradise.! 8 
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Cabot was in Brazil also when the Good Neighbor Policy took 
shape. One of its tenets, non-intervention in the internal affairs of 
Latin American nations had its roots in the Hoover, if not the 
Coolidge Administration, but was formally announced by President 
Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull in 1933. Obviously 
Cabot had no influence on the formulation of this policy, 
nevertheless, the Good Neighbor Policy characterized United States 
relations with Latin America for much of Cabot's career and, Cabot 
himself was involved in the two major incidents that led to the 
"dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy." He also played a role in 
devising the Good Neighbor Policy's successor, the Alliance for 
Progress.! 9 
After leaving "paradise", Cabot's next two assignments took 
him to Europe where he was stationed first in the Hague and then in 
Stockholm. Although he was away from Latin America for nearly 
three years, arguably his most enduring contribution came to fruition 
while he was stationed in Europe. While still stationed in Brazil, 
Cabot noted the inadequate press coverage both by the United States 
press covering Latin America and by Latin American press covering 
the United States, as he later explained: 
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I had grown increasingly dismayed by the news that was 
published there about the United States and vice versa. A few, a 
very few, newspapers gave good coverage to events which were 
important but not sensational. But most of the coverage in 
Brazilian papers was about the latest Hollywood scandal, and 
most of the Latin American news in the United States 
newspapers concerned the latest revolution. The most 
depressing thing was that there was so little coverage at all.20 
To remedy the situation, Cabot thought of having an annual 
prize awarded "to reward those newsmen who promoted friendship 
and understanding in the hemisphere." The idea was not to reward 
"those who published a lot of sugar taffy," but rather those who 
"explained the facts impartially and as fully as possible," and who 
"published unpleasant truths when they needed publication." 
Originally Cabot thought the prize might be awarded by the United 
States Government so he informally discussed the idea with 
Lawrence Duggan, Chief of the American Republics Division of the 
State Department. While Duggan felt it was a worthwhile idea he did 
not support government sponsorship, so Cabot began searching for 
private sector alternatives. Eventually, a friend in the Department 
put him in touch with the dean of the Columbia University School of 
Journalism, Carl Ackerman, who agreed that Columbia would award 
the prize. Now Cabot needed only a monetary stipend to be awarded 
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with the prize and a name for the prize. For each of these 
requirements, he turned to his parents. His father Dr. Godfrey L. 
Cabot agreed to finance the project, at first on an interim basis but 
later as a permanent endowment, and his mother Maria Moors Cabot 
lent her name to the prize which was first announced in 1938 and 
which has been awarded annually since 1939.21 
In 1938 Cabot returned to Latin American as the Second 
Secretary of Legation in Guatemala. His rank in the diplomatic 
hierarchy in Guatemala proved to be misleading. The Minister, Fay 
Allen Des Portes, was "a political appointee, and not particularly 
effective as a diplomat." Cabot, therefore played a larger than 
expected role in the diplomatic problems that the legation faced 
between 1938 and 1941. One major issue was an ongoing dispute 
between Guatemala and Great Britain over the border between 
Guatemala and British Honduras (Belize). The case was particularly 
delicate because the United States did not want to offend either a 
close European ally or a Latin American country at a time when war 
clouds were gathering in Europe and Asia. The dispute dated to 
colonial times, and although it had flared up at various times in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it had been dormant for several 
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years prior to June 1939 when President Jorge Ubico of Guatemala 
revived the issue by expressing to both London and Washington his 
desire to settle the controversy. The State Department persuaded 
Ubico not to raise the question at the Foreign Ministers of the 
American Republics Conference held in Panama in September of that 
year. The Department did, however, begin to push both parties for 
settlement through arbitration and President Roosevelt agreed to 
appoint an ad hoc arbitral tribunal. Late in 1939 it appeared that 
arbitration would be amiable to both sides, but as they discussed 
specifics, it became clear that Britain wanted arbitration to be 
limited only to questions concerning the Anglo-Guatemalan Treaty of 
1859, while Guatemala wished to introduce all relevant historical 
documents bearing on its case against Britain. 22 
Cabot became directly involved as the Charge d' affaires 
during Minister Des Portes' leaves in the winters of 1939-'40 and 
1940-'41. Almost immediately it became evident to Cabot that the 
two sides were talking about different parameters for possible 
arbitration. Later, with the two sides at an apparent impasse, Cabot 
suggested, "it might be helpful if we could display renewed interest 
in Belize matter or more particularly if we could report any definite 
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advance." Unfortunately, Cabot was not able to "report any definite 
advance" and the issue remained unresolved. Cabot's involvement in 
the Belize question, however, did not end when he left Guatemala. In 
fact he became more deeply involved following his departure, as the 
following chapter will indicate. 23 
In addition to the Belize question, while stationed in 
Guatemala, Cabot directly impacted one other important matter, the 
Banco Columbiano case. Banco Columbiano had been one of five banks 
of issue in Guatemala from which the government had borrowed. As a 
financial reform effort of the nineteen twenties, the government had 
paid off the other four in paper money and had established a new 
stabilized currency. The Banco Columbiano refused to accept this 
situation, claiming that their loan agreement called for payment in 
silver, and asked the United States to intervene because the bank 
president had "a somewhat murky claim to American citizenship." 
Cabot immediately doubted the validity of the claim and proceeded to 
study the case. He received an 80 page legal brief from the State 
Department's legal adviser’s office upholding the claim. He 
nevertheless continued to pursue the matter and as he recollected, 
"The more I went into it, the more holes I found in the Legal 
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Advisor's brief." His most important discovery was that, "the 
original loan had been made in paper and serviced in paper." Even 
with this information, however, the Department refused to dismiss 
the claim. In fact, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles ordered 
Des Portes to explain to President Ubico that Guatemala undoubtedly 
owed a great deal of money to the Banco Columbiano. When Des 
Portes went to see Ubico, according to Cabot, "He was practically 
thrown out of Ubico's office." Only after Cabot had been reassigned 
to Washington was he, "finally able to get Secretary [of State] 
Cordell Hull to abandon the unjustified claim.24 
27 
ENDNOTES 
1. John Moors Cabot, First Line of Defense: Forty Years' 
Experience of a Career Diplomat, (Washington D.C.: School of Foreign 
Service, Georgetown University, n.d.), 1. 
2. Ibid., 3. 
3. Cabot to Secretary of State, 26 June 1929, reel 1, folder 
1, Cabot Papers; for a more thorough study of the political situation 
see Robert D. Crassweller, Trujillo: The Life and Times of a 
Caribbean Dictator, (New York: MacMillan, 1966), 55-72. 
4. Curtis to Secretary of State, 1 June 1930, reel #1, folder 
1, Cabot Papers. 
5. Cabot, First Line of Defense, 6; for full account from U.S. 
legation see enclosure 1 of dispatch 24, March 1930 and Curtis to 
Secretary of State 1 June 1930, reel #1 folder 1, Cabot Papers . 
6. Cabot, First Line of Defense, 7. 
7. "Boston Boy Halts Near Revolution," Boston Herald, 25 
February 1930; "Wins Promotion to Consul Rank: John Cabot, 
Cambridge, Highly Praised for Service at Santo Domingo: Risked Life 
to Effect Mediation", Boston Herald 2 April 1930, both found in , reel 
#1 folder 1, Cabot Papers; Acting Secretary of State to President 
Hoover, 2 April 1930, reel #1, folder 1, Cabot Papers. 
8. Curtis to Secretary of State 19 May 1930, U.S. Department 
of State, Papers Relating to Foreign Relations of the United States 
1861- 1964, hereafter cited as FRUS (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1861-1993) 1930, 2:723; Curtis to Secretary of 
State, 1 June 1930, reel #1, folder 1 Cabot Papers, Cabot, First Line 
of Defense, 8. 
9. For more thorough examination this treaty and of 
Washington's abandonment of nonrecognition see John E. Findling, 
28 
Close Neighbors, Distant Friends: United States-Central American 
Relations, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987) 72-84; FRUS, 1930, 
2:725. 
10. Cabot, First Line of Defense, 8. 
11. For Cabot's commentary on his wife and the Foreign 
Service wife in general see Ibid., 135-138. Biographical sketch of 
Mrs. Cabot see, "Mrs John Moors Cabot", The Standard, 18 July 1945, 
reel #12 folder 8, Cabot Papers. 
12. Cabot, First Line of Defense, 9. 
13. William R. Garner, The Chaco Dispute: A Study of Presige 
Diplomacy, (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1966), 1. 
14. For detailed study of U.S. role in Chaco War and Leticia 
Incident see Bryce Wood, The United States and Latin American Wars 
1932-1942, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966) pt. 1 and 2. 
15. E. Bradford Burns, A History of Brazil, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1970) 292. 
16. For documents concerning negotiations on Brazil's foreign 
debt payments see, FRUS 602-623,1934 and 321-327, 1935. 
17. Burns, A History of Brazil, 290-296. 
18. Cabot, First Line of Defense, 10. 
19. For study of establishment of Good Neighbor Policy see 
Bryce Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1961); in Bryce Wood, The Dismantling of 
the Good Neighbor Policy, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), 
the author argues that U.S. intervention against Peron in Argentina 
and against Arbenz in Guatemala "dismantled" the Good Neighbor 
Policy, for Cabot's role in each see chap. 3-4 below. 
29 
21. Ibid., 10-11. 
22. Ibid., 15; For thorough account of the "Belize Question" see 
Cabot's report to the State Department entitled, "The Belize 
Question" 1 July 1943, reel #1, folder 2, Cabot Papers. 
23. Cabot to Secretary of State, 21 December 1940, FRUS, 
1940, 5:443. 
24. Cabot, First Line of Defense, 15. 
30 
CHAPTER 2 
THE WAR YEARS: 1941-1945 
The war years gave Cabot his first opportunity to work at the 
State Department in Washington. His work here began in the fall of 
1941 when, while on leave from Guatemala, he volunteered to help 
out as the Department was becoming extremely busy dealing with the 
many crises brought on by the war. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, 
Cabot became Assistant Chief of the Division of the American 
Republics, his primary responsibility securing strategic materials 
from the countries of Central America. Early in the war, 
procurement was particularly important, as the Japanese had blocked 
access to several resources previously imported from Southeast Asia 
and other parts of the Pacific. 
Four of the strategic materials needed for the war effort- 
rubber, quinine, hemp, and mahogany—were found in Central America, 
and Cabot spent much of the first two years of the war locating and 
securing new quantities of these materials. Cabot helped to 
coordinate the ongoing effort to grow rubber in Central America, a 
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project which had begun before the war, and he also directed the 
search for untapped wild rubber in the area. With the wartime 
development of a domestic synthetic rubber industry, the urgent need 
for wild rubber diminished. A similar situation arose with quinine, 
an antimalarial drug extracted from the cinchona tree which was 
normally imported from the East Indies. Cabot's department found an 
abandoned plantation of cinchona trees in Guatemala, but a short 
time later, Atabrine, a quinine substitute, was developed and the 
Guatemalan project was no longer necessary. Hemp was another 
product in great demand during the war. Cabot helped to secure hemp 
from Costa Rica, as well as sisal, which was used as a hemp 
substitute, from the Caribbean.i 
In his search for strategic materials, Cabot faced only one 
difficult diplomatic situation. When he attempted to procure 
mahogany from Guatemala, he learned that, "Guatemala, in its quarrel 
with the British over British Honduras, had closed the frontier." As 
was often the case during the war, the Central American country was 
easily persuaded by the state department to contribute to the war 
effort and the frontier was soon opened. Mahogany imports to the 
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United States followed.2 
This ad hoc wartime agreement, however, did not end the 
border dispute, and by 1943, Washington had decided to press both 
parties to settle the dispute before it could damage the war-time 
alliance or pose a threat to the desired postwar harmony. Cabot, who 
had become familiar with the issue while assigned to Guatemala, 
wrote a comprehensive report detailing the history of the dispute 
from colonial times to the present, and examining its complex legal 
questions. 
Essentially, the Cabot report argued that Britain's historic 
claim to much of the territory of Belize was itself legally 
questionable. Much of the British settlement in the area before 1821 
was in violation of two separate eighteenth century treaties 
between Britain and Spain, while certain British penetration into the 
area after 1821 violated Guatemalan sovereignty. The report 
criticized the British for forcing Guatemala to agree to the Anglo- 
Guatemalan Treaty of 1859, which expanded British territorial 
claims in the area in return for a vague promise of compensation 
which had never been honored. Although critical of the British who 
"took advantage of Guatemala's weakness," the report also recognized 
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that Guatemala was attempting to do the very same thing to the 
British, using the latter’s preoccupation with the war to push for a 
favorable settlement.3 
In July 1943, Cabot forwarded the report to Lawrence 
Duggan, Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs and 
during the next three months the two men discussed its content in a 
series of letters. Duggan complimented Cabot on the "excellent 
report," but he asked Cabot to clarify two points the Department 
deemed essential. First, "is this really the type of problem that can 
be solved in a realistic way simply on the basis of international 
law?" And second, "is there any new line that can be drawn that 
would provide a natural separation between the northern and 
southern parts that would somewhat increase Guatemalan 
territory."4 
As to Duggan's first question, Cabot replied, "the dispute can 
not be wholly decided on the basis of recognized international law." 
He based this conclusion on the understanding that there was a lack 
of judicial precedents concerning several of the legal questions 
involved in the dispute. Rather than a ruling by the World Court, 
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Cabot suggested, "that this dispute could be settled by an arbitral 
tribunal but that, although taking into account the recognized 
principles of international law, the arbitral tribunal in determining 
certain points would have to make its own law."5 
As to the second question, Cabot held that to the best of his 
knowledge, "no geographical or topographical study of southern 
British Honduras has ever been made with a view to establishing a 
possible division between Great Britain and Guatemala." 
Nevertheless, Cabot proposed as a possible natural boundary, the 
Cockscomb Mountains which ran through the area and reached a 
height of over 3,000 feet. In spite of Cabot's diligent research, and 
continued American pressure, Guatemala and Britain failed in their 
quest for a solution to the Belize question and it remained 
unresolved for decades after Cabot's involvement.6 
In addition to the Belize dispute, Cabot dealt with two other 
major policy questions during 1943—the Lend-Lease policy toward 
the American republics and the Pioneer Highway project. Lend-lease 
shipments designed to ensure hemispheric security had been sent to 
the region since early in the war, but with the threat of German or 
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Japanese aggression all but eliminated, Cabot was concerned that the 
lend-lease arms were "likely to be used for a very different purpose 
than they were intended—not one consonant with our basic political 
policies or agreeable to the American taxpayer." Cabot did not want 
to see the United States simply abandon the current hemispheric 
lend-lease program as such action would certainly lead to 
resentment by those countries which had been promised supplies. 
Instead he hoped to replace the arms currently being shipped to the 
area with equipment that could be used for long term economic 
development. In Cabot's words, he preferred "to substitute a shiny 
new bull-dozer for a shiny new howitzer." This proposed change of 
policy would serve a two-fold purpose. In Cabot's opinion, halting 
the arms buildup was critical since these arms were likely to be 
used either to suppress political opposition within a country or to 
make war on a neighboring country. In late 1943, because the course 
of the war had changed and the Axis powers threat to the hemisphere 
had diminished, the lend-lease agreement with the American 
Republics was changed and from that point the amount of lend-lease 
supplies approved for these countries was sharply reduced. Although 
the rationale for the reduction, was similar to what Cabot had 
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argued, namely that hemisphere security no longer necessitated the 
aid, military equipment was not replaced by non-military machinery 
and the decision to reduce lend-lease probably had nothing to do with 
Cabot's suggestions.? 
The Inter-American Highway project was originally passed 
by Congress and approved by the President in December 1941. The 
state department had been a major sponsor of the plan which 
envisaged a highway transversing the six countries of Central 
America. The construction was to be funded jointly with the United 
States initially providing $20 million and each of the Central 
American countries responsible for at least one third of the cost of 
their section of the highway. This project was altered in 1942 when 
the War Department decided that a highway connecting Mexico with 
Panama was strategically necessary. This Pioneer Highway, as the 
War Department called it, would be paid for entirely by the United 
States and it would follow the path of the Inter-American Highway. 
Cabot became involved in September 1943 when having spent over 
$40 million and having completed less than half of the project, "the 
War Department decided that there was no further military necessity 
for the highway and that its construction was to be discontinued." 
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The State Department's policy was that the highway project should 
be completed and Cabot along with others in the department worked 
to establish an orderly plan for transferring the project from the 
War Department to the governments of the six republics. For the 
most part this transfer went well with the Army turning over its 
equipment to local authorities so that work could continue.8 
With the exception of the Belize controversy, Cabot generally 
found disputes with Latin American countries to be easily resolved 
during the war. In most cases these countries were very willing to 
help out in the war effort and there was an unprecedented level of 
Inter-American cooperation. Within the Department itself, however, 
cooperation was not always so evident. Cabot found that, "There are 
many people who can say no to any proposition, and only a few who 
have the power to say yes and make it stick." Although he had spent 
more than a decade working in the government and was undoubtedly 
accustomed to dealing with bureaucracy, at times Cabot grew very 
frustrated with the red tape within the Department that seemed to 
slow everything down at the very time when speed was of the 
essence. As all bureaucrats must do, Cabot found some short cuts. 
Here he describes his method of getting a telegram approved quickly, 
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a process that would normally take at least several hours: 
I would wait till almost five o'clock, when everyone was 
frantically rushing to get his desk cleared, and then barge into 
the necessary offices, telegram in hand. No one under these 
circumstances was in the mood to argue, and it was amazing 
how many initials I could get on a telegram in fifteen minutes.9 
In general, his frustration with the bureaucracy not 
withstanding, Cabot found the early war years to be both positive and 
productive. There was, however, one negative episode. Early in the 
war, it was discovered that several Latin American diplomats 
stationed in Europe were selling false passports. According to 
Assistant Secretary of State James Dunn, many Jews were 
purchasing these passports in order to escape Nazi persecution. 
President Roosevelt ordered that telegrams be sent to the 
governments involved, asking that they accept the passports, but 
Cabot, along with many others in the Department objected and, in 
fact, refused to initial the telegram. The objection was that Nazis 
could be using these passports to infiltrate Latin America. In 
fairness, although anti-semitism was certainly present in the United 
States, there is no evidence that this motivated Cabot's objection 
and he obviously had no way of knowing that the holocaust was 
already beginning.! 0 
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By late 1943, the primary focus of Cabot's work shifted from 
individual efforts to research and solve wartime problems such as 
securing strategic materials and the Belize dispute, to more 
committee work aimed at planning for postwar United States-Latin 
American relations. In late 1943, Cabot was appointed to a 
committee which was "planning what was to be done in Latin 
America after the war." Apparently little came out of this 
committee, but Cabot soon received an appointment as the Latin 
American area advisor at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference which 
convened in August 1944 to discuss the groundwork for the postwar 
international organization that would eventually be called the United 
Nations.11 
The job of Latin American advisor proved to be difficult for 
Cabot because the talks were held only among the major powers and 
other foreign representatives were given virtually no information on 
any progress. More than three weeks into the conference, the 
Brazilian Ambassador complained of being kept in "complete 
ignorance" of the discussions, and went on to say that he and others 
in his government "knew nothing other than what they had seen in the 
press regarding the negotiations." The major fear among Latin 
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Americans was that the foundation was being laid for an 
international organization which might replace the Inter-American 
system that had evolved in recent years. Specifically they were 
concerned that the Good Neighbor Policy and the idea of non¬ 
intervention might be replaced by a world organization dominated by 
the major powers with the authority "to rule or ruin as they see 
fit."12 
To dispel these fears, Cabot hosted two meetings in which 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull met with Latin American 
representatives to brief them on the progress of the talks. While 
Hull refused to get specific, he did offer that "in the 
recommendations being drafted, the principles established at the 
Montevideo Conference, for example in regard to non-intervention, 
are being observed; also those fundamental to the Good Neighbor 
Policy." The Secretary went on to assure those present that "We have 
sought to increase in every possible way the functions of the 
Assembly in which every Nation will be represented." Even with 
these assurances Cabot shared the fear held by many Latin American 
representatives that the proposed international organization would 
give the major powers too much power at the expense of weaker 
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countries, like those of Latin America, and that the international 
organization could jeopardize the existing Inter-American system.13 
Once the Dumbarton Oaks Conference ended, Cabot continued 
working with postwar preparations. He was appointed as Technical 
Officer on the United States delegation to the Inter-American 
Conference on Problems of War and Peace which was held in Mexico 
City from February 21, to March 8,1945. The delegates at this 
conference worked out a 61 point resolution which became known as 
the Act of Chapultepec. The United States delegation considered this 
effort to be "the culmination of the Good Neighbor Policy." According 
to Cabot, the conference "laid the foundation for economic 
cooperation between the American Republics after the war," and 
"established for the first time that an act of war against any 
American republic would be considered an act of war against all." 
Additionally, Cabot claimed that much of what was eventually to 
become the charter for the Organization of American States was 
worked out at Chapultepec. Cabot's appraisal probably exaggerates 
the significance of the Act of Chapultepec, as in reality it was little 
more than a restatement of several general principles of Inter- 
American relations such as non-intervention and collective security 
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that had been evolving for several years. Nevertheless the 
conference did soften United States-Latin American relations after 
the hard feelings the Dumbarton Oaks Conference had left. According 
to a memorandom sent to Washington by the American contingent at 
the conclusion of the conference, the Latin American delegations felt 
that they were "again fully participant in international affairs and 
able to make influence effective both within hemisphere and in 
reference to world security program."''4 
The positive and cooperative mood of the Mexico City 
Conference was short-lived as Cabot learned during his next 
assignment as Political and Liaison Officer to the United States 
delegation at the United Nations Conference which convened in San 
Francisco in April 1945. As a "lowly liaison officer" at this 
Conference Cabot was not a participant in the high level meetings, 
but he did work very closely with the Latin American delegations and 
kept the United States officials informed as to their concerns. 
Specifically, the Latin Americans were apprehensive that a Security 
Council veto would lead to deadlock on major issues and thus raise 
the possibility of a member of the Security Council’s domination of 
a smaller country with no United Nations interference. Cabot 
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expressed his agreement with the Latin American objections in a 
lengthy memorandom written at the Conference: 
I submit that the sweeping veto powers given the great powers 
are not essential to the protection of our national interests, and 
that granting of such powers is likely to make the entire 
organization a fraud upon the American people. ... In any 
situation threatening a great war, the right of any one of the 
five great powers to block action by the organization . . . makes 
it not only possible but probable that the organization's 
machinery will be stalled when most needed. . . . [The veto] 
would also suffice to prevent the inter-American system from 
taking action under the Act of ChapultepecJ 5 
Although they failed to kill the veto, Latin American 
delegates successfully pushed for Article 51 which in the absence of 
Security Council action allowed regional security systems to act in 
the event of armed aggression. This victory alleviated one of Cabot's 
fears and in effect made possible the Inter-American security 
system which had been evolving and which would be formalized in 
the charter of the Organization of American States in 1948. During 
the Conference, the Secretary of State assigned Cabot to be 
Counselor in the American Embassy in Argentina and as soon as the 
conference concluded he once again left for Latin America.! 6 
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CHAPTER 3 
ARGENTINA: 1945 - 1946 
Cabot's reassignment came as the war drew to a close. A 
personal friend, Spruille Braden, had recently been appointed as 
Ambassador to Argentina and he requested Cabot as his counselor. 
Cabot, who had generally enjoyed his previous embassy positions in 
South America, gladly accepted, unaware that he would soon be 
immersed in a very heated personal feud between Ambassador Braden 
and the de facto ruler of the country, Juan Peron, who at that time 
held the offices of Vice President, Minister of War and Minister of 
Labor.! 
American objectives regarding relations with Argentina at 
this time essentially were twofold. To assist the Argentine 
government in locating and ridding the country of Nazis who had 
escaped Europe at the end of the war, and to bring Argentina back 
into the fold of American states after their pro-Axis stance during 
the war. In pursuit of these objectives, Braden was understandably 
frustrated having to deal with Peron, a man he perceived to be a 
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fascist and Nazi-sympathizer. By the time Cabot arrived in Buenos 
Aires in July of 1945, Braden had already made a series of speeches 
in which he articulated these perceptions of Peron. In dispatches 
sent to Washington during the month of July, Braden asked for some 
type of multinational condemnation of Peron, and warned that, "So 
long as Peron and the military remain in control of this country we 
are faced with a fundamental policy issue, importance of which 
cannot be exaggerated. Appeasement [of Peron] will be fatal and we 
must rightly stand on our principles." Later Braden extended his 
previous warnings by quoting former Secretary of State Hull that the 
Nazi-Fascist movement was "entrenched in Argentina" and that it 
was "in a position to build up its strength and to prepare for future 
aggression."2 
At the same time, Peron was countering Braden's 
accusations with speeches, demonstrations and most importantly an 
advertising campaign aimed at smearing the Ambassador's 
reputation. This last tactic started just days after Cabot's arrival, 
and featured handbills, posters and pamphlets. Some compared 
Braden to a circus master, others said he was an Al Capone, "trying 
to blackmail the country," and several labelled him "cowboy Braden, 
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tamer of South American Governments." Peron thus hoped to convince 
the people of Argentina of something that Cabot had already 
observed, "that Braden was getting up to his neck in internal 
politics."3 
Only two months after Cabot's arrival, Ambassador Braden 
was recalled to Washington, where in his new position as Assistant 
Secretary of State he continued and even intensified his campaign 
against Peron. With Braden's departure Cabot became the Charge 
d'Affaires and found himself in the middle of the continuing battle 
between Braden and Peron. Although Cabot shared Braden's contempt 
for Peron and saw his government as corrupt and at times 
dictatorial, he did not always agree with the Ambassadors tactics, 
particularly those of directly interfering in the internal affairs of 
Argentina. Cabot not only believed this interference violated the 
Good Neighbor Policy, but he also noted that in the past it was not 
usually effective; in fact, it often backfired on the United States and 
made situations worse instead of better. Years later, Cabot recalled 
his discussion of the topic with the Ambassador. 
I expressed my concern to Braden, forcefully pointing out the 
danger of getting involved in the country's internal affairs. I 
was the more impelled to do this because I had been brought up 
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on the doctrine of non-intervention and I could recall various 
episodes in which intervention had ended disastrously.4 
Cabot's predilection put him in an awkward position during 
the next several months. With Braden as one of his superiors Cabot 
was often ordered to do the very thing that he questioned, namely to 
interfere in the internal political matters of the country. For a short 
time it looked as if Braden's tactics had succeeded, and the problem 
had been solved. In early October, less than two weeks after the 
Ambassador's departure for Washington, a coup forced Peron from 
power. This success, however, proved to be short-lived, as Peron 
returned to power within month. At this very time the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, as part of its confirmation hearings 
for his new position, was criticizing Braden for his political 
activities in Argentina. Cabot felt that the negative publicity given 
the United States by these hearings played a significant role in 
Peron's reestablishing power, as many different factions in 
Argentina turned to Peron as the one leader capable of standing up to 
what they saw as American bullying.5 
Despite his serious misgivings Cabot went along with 
Braden's tactics during his first several months in the country. By 
November 17, however, Cabot had reevaluated his position and on 
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that date he sent a lengthy letter to the Director of the Office of 
American Republic Affairs expressing several grave doubts about the 
wisdom of the Department's handling of the situation in Argentina. 
In particular, Cabot questioned two of the Department's fundamental 
assumptions: that Peron was definitely a fascist, and that Argentine 
fascism was aggressive in nature, and thereby a threat to the 
hemisphere. Cabot argued that, "there is a fairly impressive amount 
of evidence to indicate that Argentina is not and can never become 
truly fascist," and that "I do not believe that we can justify 
avowedly coercive measures, even multilateral, on the basis of the 
comparatively nebulous proof we now have that Peron is plotting 
aggression." He questioned, moreover, the effectiveness of a "crack¬ 
down" on Argentina, and the belief that the upcoming February 
elections would necessarily be fraudulent.6 
In another letter, this one to William Cochran, Chief, Division 
of Caribbean and Central American Affairs, dated December 14, Cabot 
expressed growing concerns, almost to the point of disbelief, 
regarding United States policy: 
I wonder if I might ask you very quietly to let me know what 
under the sun is going on in the Department today. I find it 
difficult to believe that a number of the Department's recent 
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telegrams represent the result of cool thinking; on the contrary 
I am disturbed at indications that the Department, sensing 
Peron's potential danger, is saying and doing a lot of things 
which it will later have reason to regret. Recent telegrams have 
been full of evidence that the Department is feverishly trying to 
establish a case against Peron which does not exist to anything 
like the extent that we would like. A number of public 
statements have certainly been inaccurate and others, in my 
opinion, have been unwise ... It seems to me not only that our 
Argentine policy may collapse in a grand smash, burying its 
principal authors, but also that the Good Neighbor Policy may be 
torn to ribbons.7 
However critical of the present situation, Cabot stressed 
that he was not pushing for a policy of appeasement, rather that, "we 
must make perfectly clear on every suitable occasion our support of 
democratic principles and our repudiation of the worst acts of this 
Government." Cabot concluded, "our policy should basically be a 
continued full crack-down on the Nazis and a cold, not a hot- 
tempered policy towards the present Government 8 
Not only did the Department remain unconvinced that a 
reversal of policy was necessary, but apparently Cabot also had not 
completely convinced himself for on December 4, he sent a telegram 
to the Secretary of State reminding him that Argentine elections 
were scheduled for February and "earliest possible publication of 
material extracted from German archives regarding Argentine 
Government is imperative." Underlying his apparent change of heart 
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on the subject of United States interference was his belief that, "it 
would be grossly partial to the pro-Axis forces in this country to 
conceal from Argentine public matters of vital importance to latter 
in choosing new government." The State Department granted Cabot's 
request and released a series of captured German documents which 
linked much of the pro-Peronist press and political faction to the 
Berlin. Needless to say, the Peronistas were outraged. Cabot, 
however, found reaction from the other elements in the country to be 
"unbelievably favorable."9 
By early February, with the elections less than three weeks 
away, it appeared Washington's strategy was going to be successful. 
According to Cabot, "Peron has suffered a series of disasters 
recently and majority of observers now think he cannot win 
elections." At this same time the State Department decided to 
release "a comprehensive statement demonstrating Argentine Nazi 
complicity and conspiracy." This Blue Book, as it came to be known, 
was in Cabot's opinion, "not an objective study but a polemic." It 
contained "a number of factual errors," it reflected a "gross bias," 
and it "distorted the record."! o 
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Cabot clearly opposed the release of the Blue Book, but not 
necessarily for the reasons cited above. His real objections were 
based on practical rather than philosophical arguments. Given the 
timing just days before the election—and the document's blatant 
attack on Peron, Cabot warned that it could very likely backfire. 
After sending two separate telegrams advising the Department 
against releasing the Blue Book, Cabot received a response from 
Secretary of State James Byrnes expressing that the Department had 
carefully considered Cabot's objections, but had decided in favor of 
releasing the Blue Book.i l 
Much to Cabot's surprise, he found the initial reaction to the 
Blue Book in Argentina to be one of "stunned humiliation," and 
surmised from his communications with various Argentines that the 
effect was likely to be "increased repudiation of Peronism." While 
reporting these sentiments to Washington, however, he also 
predicted—accurately as it turned out—that Peron would launch a 
counter attack. What the Charge had not foreseen was the success of 
Peron's rejoinder. Peron attacked Assistant Secretary Braden for his 
continued interference in Argentine politics stated that, "the Blue 
Book signifies, rather than an analysis of an international case, an 
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interference in internal affairs of our country." Its release so close 
to the elections "was contrary to the practice of international law," 
and "its purpose may be to influence decisions which lie exclusively 
in the will of the Argentine people, called to elections on the 24th of 
the current month."12 
Years later, Cabot recalled that a Peronista friend came to 
him just after the Blue Book appeared and said, "Thanks, that has won 
us the election." Within a week of the Blue Book’s release, Cabot was 
reporting to Washington that even "in democratic elements opinion 
appears to be swinging against timing of publication of Blue Book." 
Cabot's apprehensions regarding the issuance of the Blue Book turned 
out to be well-founded as Peron did win the election. In the weeks 
after the election, Cabot was repeatedly instructed by Washington to 
uncover evidence of fraud or even methods of possible fraud that 
could have been used by the Peronists. In the end, however, he was 
forced to admit, "Voting procedures and counting of ballots have 
unquestionably been fairest in Argentine history."! 3 
Peron's victory, particularly in a "fair" election, put Cabot in 
particular, but Washington in general, in the very awkward position 
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of having to conduct relations with a man that the State Department 
had been trying to defeat for nearly a year. Even worse, the 
democratic elements in Argentina blamed Cabot for their loss. 
Ironically they argued that it was Cabot's release of the Blue Book 
which accounted for the Peronists success. As if being disliked by 
both sides in Argentina were not enough, Cabot also received much 
undeserved criticism from the American press which accused him of 
misinforming the department as to Peron's popularity and costing the 
indigenous democrats the victory. The Boston Herald contended that, 
"Cabot figured Argentina's election 99 per cent wrong, he zigged 
when he should have zagged." The paper concluded with the more 
personal attack that "Cabot had little heart for the job ... he 
certainly wasn't cut out for it.14 
At this juncture, surrounded by criticism, both at home and 
abroad, and unpopular with both Argentine political factions, Cabot 
was certainly not in a strong position to implement policy. He went 
about his job as best he could, however, immediately advising the 
Washington against any further attempts to oust Peron, and arguing 
that the it should attempt to improve relations by basing policy not 
on what Peron had done in the past, but rather on what he was likely 
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to do in the future. At the same time, Cabot also suggested, "I should 
obviously be transferred since I am inevitably associated here with 
the policy of toughness."! 5 
Cabot's experiences in both Argentina and the Dominican 
Republic had a lasting effect on his beliefs regarding United States 
intervention in Latin America. Although he had always supported the 
Good Neighbor Policy in principle, he concluded based on his 
relationships with Peron and Trujillo, 
there are two essential reasons why we cannot interfere in the 
internal affairs of other nations. First, our treaty obligations 
bind us. However, behind these obligations is our feeling that it 
is unwise to attempt such interference. When we have 
attempted it the results have been counter-effective, having 
harmed the democratic groups we wished to help.! 6 
Cabot spent most of his remaining months in Argentina helping 
coordinate the effort to track down Nazi's who had taken refuge after 
the war, and awaiting an announcement of United States policy 
toward the new Peron Government. The State Department finally 
decided to defer any new policy statement until after a new 
ambassador had been appointed and given a chance personally to 
survey the situation. The new Ambassador, George S. Messersmith, 
arrived in May and immediately began to take a more conciliatory 
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approach, so much so that Cabot spent his last two months in 
Argentina attempting, "to prevent him from doing too much too 
soon."! 7 
In July, the Department invited Cabot to return to Washington 
where they enrolled him in a four month course at the National War 
College. This course was designed for people with experience in the 
armed forces or the State Department who "may become leaders in 
their fields in future years." Cabot's brief tenure at the National War 
College was followed by four successive assignments outside of 
Latin America. In 1947, he first went to Yugoslavia where he advised 
the State Department to encourage the split that was developing 
between the USSR and Yugoslavia. The following year he departed for 
China where he saw the Communists prevail in the Civil War in that 
country, then he spent two years as Minister to Finland and finally 
one year as Ambassador to Pakistan. In 1953 he returned to 
Washington and again turned his attention to the issues germane to 
Latin American affairs.18 
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CHAPTER 4 
WASHINGTON D. C.: 1953 - 1954 
In February of 1953 Cabot was appointed to be Assistant 
Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs. Although he had 
spent the previous six years in Europe and Asia, this was certainly a 
position for which Cabot was well-qualified. Cabot had spent most 
of his professional life either on assignments in Latin America or 
dealing with Latin American affairs while stationed in Washington. 
Even when stationed in Yugoslavia or China, Cabot never lost contact 
with his many friends and acquaintances from Latin America and 
from his early years in the Foreign Service he always considered 
Latin America as his primary field of interest as well as his area of 
expertise. 
From the very outset, as Assistant Secretary of State for 
American Republic Affairs, Cabot fought a constant struggle over the 
amount of money that should be spent and types of aid programs that 
the United States should support in the region. He later recalled 
that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles assigned him his task in 
these terms, "devise an imaginative policy for Latin America—but 
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don't spend any money." United States-Latin American relations had 
reached a high point during World War II, but the Cold War had forced 
the Truman administration to turn its attention elsewhere, 
consequently relations had deteriorated. Given the Cold War 
priorities, it seemed unlikely that the Eisenhower administration 
would have either the will or the resources to remedy this 
deterioration. Nevertheless, Cabot made repeated attempts to revise 
the administration's Latin American policy. Each of his attempts, 
however, was met with two insurmountable obstacles: the President, 
and to an even greater extent Secretary of State Dulles, viewed Latin 
America as important only to the extent that it was part of the world 
wide struggle against communism; Secretary of the Treasury, George 
M. Humphrey, viewed any new spending, especially in an area of 
questionable importance such as Latin America, as completely 
unnecessary and a threat to his efforts to balance the budget.1 
Cabot began his new job in February of 1953, just in time to 
attend the Caracas Conference of the Inter-American Council of 
Social and Economic Affairs. At this time the new administration 
was still working on its Latin America strategy and the United 
States delegation was in no position to make any concrete proposals. 
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Cabot, however, realized even before the Caracas Conference that 
current policy was not going to satisfy growing demand for both 
economic and social reform. Cabot’s fears proved to be well-founded 
as he discovered at the Caracas Conference when the American 
delegation was the target of criticism from all sides. Among the 
"strongly expressed views" that Cabot heard were that Latin 
American countries 
had been unfairly treated in terms of trade; that over a period 
of years the raw materials they produced had tended to fall in 
price in relation to the price of manufactured goods they had to 
import ... it was unfair that the dollar reserves they had 
accumulated during the war by selling to us should have dropped 
sharply after the war in terms of what they then wanted to buy 
from us . . . They complained of our customs barriers, which keep 
out their products and force them to send us raw material 
rather than semi-manufactured items . . . And they frankly found 
it hard to understand that we gave them practically no grant 
aid.2 
Despite these articulated concerns, the mood of the 
conference on the whole was cordial and cooperative. Nevertheless, 
Cabot became more convinced that, "the handwriting was on the 
wall--our friends were going to make more and more demands on us 
and be satisfied less and less with the concessions which we would 
make to them such as: the Inter-American Development Bank; grant 
aid for a variety of projects . . . and stabilization of raw-material 
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prices." A diary entry made at the conference again points to the 
assistant secretary's skepticism regarding the effectiveness of 
current policy and to his understanding that the major elements 
underlying Latin American policy were social and economic rather 
than political: 
In thinking over fundamentals I am impressed again with the 
thought that so many of the specific cases in which our 
economic cooperation is sought give no direct or palpable 
benefits to Latin American workers and small farmers and that 
they are the key in the fight against communism ... I was as 
usual much impressed with the blindness of the upper classes in 
Latin America. They really think that anyone since Louis XIV is 
a communist.3 
Cabot's skepticism turned into a warning in a speech given 
less than one month after the Caracas Conference when he predicted: 
Social reform is coming. It may come by evolution or by 
revolution. There are reactionary elements in every country of 
this hemisphere which do not want social reform. They are 
willing to tie down the safety valve and to wait for the boiler to 
burst . . . We simply cannot afford to identify with the elements 
which would tie down the social safety valve. That wouldn't 
protect our national interests: it wouldn't even for long protect 
our investments.4 
Cabot's growing awareness of the rising tide of discontent and 
his bold prediction of the coming of social reform did not sit well 
with either the ruling elites of Latin America or the new 
administration which was currently following the established policy 
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of embracing reactionary governments and dictators of the region in 
the name of anti-communism. 
In the same month that Cabot delivered his "social reform" 
speech, the administration formalized its Latin American policy with 
the approval of NSC 144/1 on March 18, 1953. Although somewhat 
less bold than Cabot's statements, the policy paper did recognize that 
there was in Latin America, "an increasing popular demand for 
immediate improvement in the low living standards of the masses." 
It went on, however, to describe typical cold war objectives for 
American policy in the area: "hemispheric solidarity in support of 
our world policies . . . orderly political and economic development . . . 
safeguarding of the hemisphere," and adequate "access by the United 
States to, raw materials essential to United States security."5 
To achieve these objectives, the draft suggested a number of 
courses of action. The political avenues centered around the idea of 
collective security—"greater utilization of the Organization of 
American States", "greater consideration of Latin American problems 
at the highest levels of government" and "refraining from overt 
unilateral intervention in the internal affairs of other American 
states." The economic suggestions included maintaining or even 
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slightly increasing the current levels of funding for grants, technical 
assistance and loans to the area, but at the same time "encouraging 
Latin American governments to recognize that the bulk of capital 
required for their economic development can best be supplied by 
private enterprise."6 
For the most part, the policies outlined in NSC 144/1 were a 
continuation of the Good Neighbor Policy as practiced by the Truman 
administration, the same policies that Cabot had envisioned for the 
administration. The problem, however, surfaced when Cabot began to 
realize that not only would there be no slight increases in funding, in 
fact he would have to spend the next year struggling to maintain the 
levels that had already been set by the previous administration. In 
addition to budgetary problems, Cabot soon recognized that the idea 
of "greater consideration" at the "highest levels of government" 
might receive some lip-service, but it was not to become a reality 
until late in the decade when events in Latin America forced the 
President to give the region greater consideration. 
Before the Assistant Secretary became fully aware of the 
difficulties he would face, he was busy with two different fact¬ 
finding trips. First, Cabot travelled to Mexico, the Central American 
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countries and much of the Caribbean. Ostensibly a routine fact¬ 
finding mission, the trip's real overriding purpose was to "find out 
what could be done about Guatemala, "where democratically elected 
president, Jacobo Arbenz, was openly allowing communist 
infiltration in his government. Even before Cabot had undertaken his 
itinerary, there were those in the administration pushing for a CIA 
sponsored coup. Cabot, who had become a staunch opponent of 
intervention by Washington in Latin American politics, argued that 
"it would be better to work through the Organization of American 
States if that were possible."7 
It soon became clear to Cabot that the OAS might be unable 
to resolve the situation. In March, just weeks before the trip, 
relations had deteriorated when the Guatemalan Supreme Court 
denied an appeal by the American owned United Fruit Company to 
reverse an order expropriating 230,000 acres of the company's land. 
On March 25, Cabot handed the Guatemalan Ambassador an aid- 
memoire outlining the Department's objections that the Guatemalan 
government had failed to offer just compensation for the 
expropriations. In April, Cabot visited the Foreign Minister of 
Guatemala in Guatemala City, a man he found to be a "complete 
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jackass who talked endlessly without making any sense." He also 
spoke with President Arbenz who showed no interest in changing 
government policy. On his return, Cabot reported to the State 
Department that Arbenz had "obviously sold out to the communists 
and that was that." 
On this same trip, Cabot received less than enthusiastic 
endorsements of his attempts to gain support for any type of OAS 
action against Guatemala. Cabot was frustrated to find that most of 
the Latin leaders either questioned that Guatemala was falling to 
communism and thus posed a threat to the region, or doubted that 
collective action would be effective. In Columbia, Cabot "made no 
progress on Guatemala ... [El Salvador] did not seem interested in 
putting a stop to Guatemala's gross attempts at subversion." Even 
Honduras which was concerned about the situation and felt that 
something should be done, argued that the action must be undertaken 
by the United States The lack of support found in the area, and his 
conclusion that Arbenz had "obviously sold out to the communists," 
notwithstanding, Cabot was still not immediately convinced that a 
coup was the best solution. Repeatedly in his speeches and writings, 
Cabot had opposed the idea of unilateral intervention by Washington 
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both because it subverted United States relations with Latin 
American, and because as a practical matter it was almost never 
produced the desired results.8 
Nevertheless, by September, after a fruitless series of 
diplomatic exchanges with Guatemala, and "after much soul 
searching," Cabot told Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith 
that "a CIA-organized coup was the only solution." As Cabot soon 
learned, such plans were already underway. Although he stayed in 
contact with a liaison officer who was coordinating the efforts of 
various involved agencies, Cabot apparently never knew the details of 
the plan. He had been transferred to Sweden, moreover, before the 
plan was executed. Cabot had been a consistent and vocal opponent of 
intervention in the internal affairs of Latin American countries, but 
he was able to rationalize that the CIA involvement in the 
Guatemalan coup was not intervention. Years later he justified his 
approval of the coup: 
For those who decry the Guatemalan coup as the "immoral" 
overthrow of a "democratically" elected government I would 
rejoin that Arbenz was elected solely because he had had 
Aranha—who would otherwise clearly have been elected— 
murdered; that the Arbenz regime had made several efforts to 
overthrow the regimes of neighboring countries; and that 
Guatemala was on a course which would have made it—as Cuba 
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later became—a menace to our national security.9 
Cabot arrived home from his trip through Central America in 
late April, just in time to finalize plans for a second trip. On this 
trip Cabot would join the President's brother Dr. Milton Eisenhower 
on a fact-finding foray between June 23 and July 28 that would take 
them to each of the South American countries. There they were "(1) 
to express the good will of the United States toward the governments 
and peoples visited; (2) to secure factual information regarding 
conditions in these countries which impinge our relations with them; 
and (3) to report to the President and the Secretary of State on the 
basis of the information secured as to the possible means of 
strengthening the friendly relations between the United States and 
the countries visited."! o 
The trip went very smoothly, with the delegation being "warmly 
greeted in all of the countries visited." Although the greetings were 
warm and the talks were generally very cordial, the South American 
leaders quietly expressed the resentment that had been building for 
nearly a decade. They complained of being ignored by the United 
States and they demanded that Washington provide them with more 
economic aid. It certainly would not have required a trip through 
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South America to learn this. In fact, since World War II, and 
particularly since the Marshall Plan, the common belief was that the 
United States was "helping ex-enemies more than ... [it was] helping 
nations which were our oldest associates and our great helpers in 
World War II." This point was certainly valid, but even a pro-Latin 
America diplomat like Cabot admitted that while the region had been 
neglected in the past and it was in need of assistance, the area's 
problems were "humdrum rather than vital to our security." Because 
they were humdrum, Cabot realized from the start that for him to 
convince the administration of the need for a new approach would not 
be easy. On the other hand, Cabot was apparently one of the few 
people anywhere in the government who realized at this time that 
these "humdrum" problems would eventually become "vital to our 
security" if they went unchecked. Although Cabot recognized the 
need for a change in policy, it would soon become evident to him that 
regardless of the expressed purposes of the trip, it was really 
intended as merely a good will visit and the administration had no 
real interest in significantly altering current Latin American 
policy.! l 
Immediately upon their return, Milton Eisenhower and Cabot 
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went to the White House to brief the President. After this briefing, 
Milton Eisenhower prepared a formal report which was finally 
presented to the President in November of 1953. The report was 
widely criticized as orthodox, unimaginative and uncreative as far as 
policy initiatives were concerned. Even the author would later 
admit that while he saw the enormous need for social reform, he was 
not at that time able to see how American policy might be changed in 
order to facilitate reform and to design a more imaginative and 
effective strategy. This is not to say, however, that there was 
nothing new in the report, or that the recommendations were entirely 
without merit. In fact, much of Cabot's remaining time as Assistant 
Secretary was occupied with the basic problem of how to gain 
acceptance for a new policy toward Latin America-one grounded 
extensively in the recommendations of Milton Eisenhower's report.12 
By this time Cabot had certainly developed a keen sense of 
the true problems facing Latin America and, indirectly, the United 
States. Although Cabot was a fervent anticommunist, he did not 
agree with Secretary Dulles that Latin American policy was only 
important in terms of its role in the world-wide fight against 
communism. He had become aware that it was more than simply a 
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lack of economic development and political stability which plagued 
the area. It was the vast disparity between the ruling classes and 
the miserably poor masses. In fact, Cabot was convinced that the 
way to win the Cold War in Latin America was to help effect the 
social reform that was so desperately needed in order to eliminate 
the poverty and hopelessness that provided an attractive setting for 
communist propaganda. He had also become aware that current policy 
was not working and that a revision of that policy was not only 
desirable, but necessary, if the region were to develop by evolution 
rather than by revolution. 
While Cabot, more than almost anyone else in the 
administration, recognized an urgent need for a shift in policy, he 
also acknowledged the administration's commitment to economy. His 
plan, therefore was by no means inordinately expensive or in any way 
a radical departure from past policy. Indeed, the only part of the plan 
which would cost the government anything was a request for 
$17,000,000 for a variety of small developmental projects 
throughout the area. This proposal was not only one of Dr. 
Eisenhower's recommendations, but it also seemed well within the 
limits of the spending increases envisioned in NSC 144/1 . That fact, 
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plus Cabot's belief that $17,000,000 was a "pitiful sum," made it all 
the more frustrating when he "couldn't get to first base at any 
echelon of the [State] Department, let alone other agencies of the 
government." Secretary Dulles, who according to Cabot, "wasn't at 
all interested in Inter-American questions, except peripherally as a 
side issue in his anti-Communist crusade, "was responsible for 
rejecting the proposal before it even got out of the Department. 
Ironically, the following year, as Cabot was being transferred from 
Washington, both Dulles and President Eisenhower approved an 
almost identical sum as part of a proposal to be advanced at the 
economic conference that would be held in Caracas in February.! 3 
Cabot ran into similar obstacles when he pushed for another 
of Milton Eisenhower's recommendations, that of assigning $1 billion 
to the Export-Import Bank to finance viable long term development 
projects. Earlier in the year the administration had decided that the 
Export-Import Bank would no longer extend long term developmental 
loans since they would unbalance the budget. Although Dulles had 
originally supported the decision to halt the loans, Cabot was able to 
convince him to back the proposal. Opposition then came from 
Secretary Humphrey, who was not impressed with Cabot's arguments 
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that not only was this action necessary in terms of improving 
relations with Latin America, but "that it [also] would be possible for 
the Export-Import Bank to expand its operations in Latin America 
without necessarily having an adverse effect on the national debt." 
As Cabot pointed out, most Latin American countries had very good 
records of repaying Export-Import Bank loans, and the money 
appropriated would really be an investment rather than simply an 
expenditure because loans from the bank had "regularly made 
substantial profits for the United States Treasury."! 4 
Not only was Humphrey opposed to the expansion of the 
Export-Import Bank, but he also questioned requests for technical 
assistance and military aid which had previously become a standard 
part of the budget. Cabot argued vehemently against any cuts in 
technical aid. In a news conference held upon his return from South 
America, he announced, "we are getting an awful big dollar's worth of 
every dollar we put into our technical cooperation. It's really 
accomplishing a great deal." Although the Export-Import Bank 
proposal was, for the time being, rejected, the continuation of 
technical assistance and military aid was approved. Once again, as in 
the previous case with the developmental loans, before the Caracas 
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Conference in 1954, President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles 
reversed the Export-Import Bank limitations, thus as Cabot was 
being replaced, another part of his program was approved.! 5 
How to deal with the purchasing and stockpiling of strategic 
materials found in Latin America was the third part of Cabot's plan. 
In recent years, the United States had been stockpiling certain 
strategic materials. This was done for security purposes, but it also 
had helped stabilize prices of these materials. Because so many of 
the Latin American economies depended on the sale of single 
resource, these countries were extremely sensitive to world prices, 
thus a halt of the current practice could spell doom for several Latin 
American economies. Cabot advocated continuing this practice, but 
with the end of the war in Korea and the push for economy in 
government, there was much debate over the necessity of continuing 
this policy. This debate again featured Cabot with the support of 
Dulles against Humphrey who was, "as usual opposed to spending 
money." This issue would eventually be decided in favor of Cabot's 
proposal, but once again victory postdated his departure from 
Washington.! 6 
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Cabot's resignation or removal as Assistant Secretary was 
the most publicized and controversial aspect of his brief tenure. The 
State Department offered the official version on February 11, 1954 
when it announced that the President had appointed Cabot as 
Ambassador to Sweden. Along with the announcement, the 
Department released the press copies of an exchange of letters 
earlier in the month between Cabot and Dulles. Cabot explained to 
the Secretary that, 
During the past year I have earnestly tried to carry out the 
President's and your wishes to improve our hemispheric 
relations. In doing this, I have found it a handicap that my 
experience has been predominately in the foreign political field, 
whereas the problems are largely in the economic and financial 
fields ... I have reached the conviction that their solution 
might be easier for someone whose training and experience was 
in these fields.17 
In reply Dulles stated, "I am inclined to agree with your 
analysis of the situation in that under the conditions which now 
prevail, our problems in this hemisphere revolve primarily around 
economic and trade factors." The Secretary complimented Cabot on 
the "excellent quality of work" he had done and assured him that he 
would soon be given a "major position" which would better suit his 
training and skills. The day after Cabot received this reply from 
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Dulles he also received word of his appointment as Ambassador to 
Sweden and immediately submitted his official resignation effective 
on his confirmation as Ambassador.! 8 
The press immediately attacked the official version of the 
resignation. The day following the announcement an article appeared 
in the New York Times which stated that Cabot "was being shifted as 
a result of a basic disagreement with the Treasury Department over 
the economic policy toward Latin America." The article went on to 
allege that "George M. Humphrey, Secretary of the Treasury, has 
emphasized the opposition to policies favored by Mr. Cabot."! 9 
An entirely different version of Cabot's removal appeared in 
the Washington Post A March 1 article written by Drew Pearson 
claimed that "Cabot was actually fired by the President's brother 
Milton Eisenhower who has become the chief Administration 
policymaker on Latin America." Pearson claimed that although Cabot 
was a "sincere, conscientious, hard-working career diplomat," he 
also had "a habit of rubbing some people the wrong way." As soon as 
they returned from the South American trip, Dr. Eisenhower, "quietly 
went about transferring Cabot to another post."20 
78 
In addition to the above explanations, Cabot was told by 
Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith that his ouster was 
because "Eisenhower supporters in Texas had been promised this job 
for a nominee of their choice, and now they were ready to pick up 
their option with a man named Henry Holland."21 
The only explanation that Cabot flatly denied was that he 
was fired for disagreeing with Humphrey. Although he admitted that 
the two had disagreed on policy, he also said that this disagreement 
was "natural and proper" given their different positions within the 
government. He also expressed a "personal liking and admiration" for 
Secretary Humphrey. While it cannot be definitively dismissed, the 
argument that Humphrey had Cabot removed is not completely cogent 
given the fact that Cabot and Humphrey had relatively little direct 
contact and that Cabot was only one of any number of people within 
the State Department and within the administration in general who 
disagreed with Humphrey's tight fisted economic policies.22 
Publicly, Cabot acquiesced in the official explanation that he 
had stepped down to make room for someone better skilled to deal 
with the current problems. The fact that the experienced and capable 
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Cabot was replaced by Henry Holland, a Houston attorney with 
virtually no diplomatic experience made the official explanation 
appear, at the very least, highly dubious and certainly lent credence 
to the alternative given by Smith that it was a political decision. 
Privately, Cabot rejected the official version and acknowledged that 
in fact he had been "kicked upstairs." In a letter to his brother, Tom 
Cabot, dated March 14, 1954, he admitted:23 
Precisely what happened I do not yet know; you can take your 
pick of Bedell Smith's story that it was just political pressure, 
and Drew Pearson's that Milton Eisenhower had me eased out. 
This much j_s established, that the decision was made early last 
August . . . and I suspect whoever made the decision felt I didn't 
know my Latin Economics.24 
If, as Cabot asserts, the decision was made in early August, 
it would seem likely that Milton Eisenhower had something to do 
with Cabot's removal since at that time they had just returned from 
more than a month together in South America and Cabot had not yet 
begun to push for his new Latin American policy. It would seem, 
however, unlikely that Dr. Eisenhower would remove the very person 
who was pressing for acceptance of his plan unless Cabot really did 
"rub him the wrong way." Yet, that appears unlikely given the fact 
that the two maintained a social as well as a professional 
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relationship for years after the episode. 
Whatever the exact reason for Cabot's departure, it seems 
likely that the decision was made well in advance of the actual 
announcement, as the administration's timing could not have been 
worse. They had dismissed their top Latin American advisor at 
precisely the time when they were finally accepting the program for 
which he had been pushing. Even Cabot, however, realized that the 
sudden acceptance of his Latin American proposals had little or 
nothing to do with his efforts or with any realization within the 
administration that they were necessary or appropriate. Instead, the 
administration suddenly reversed itself because it desperately 
wanted to gain Latin American support for an anti-communist 
resolution at the Tenth Inter-American Conference which would be 
held in Caracas in March. In part, the declaration would state, "the 
domination or control of the political institutions of any American 
state by the international communist movement . . . would constitute 
a threat" to the entire hemisphere and would require "appropriate 
4 
action in accordance with existing treaties." Such language 
presumably would give the administration some legal justification 
for the action it was planning to undertake in Guatemala against 
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President Arbenz. With this contingency in mind, President 
Eisenhower approved most of the Cabot plan which had been rejected 
in the previous months. Long term Export-Import Bank loans were 
promised, a $17 million increase in funding for "small development 
projects" was approved, and a promise was made to keep United 
States markets open to Latin American exports. Going beyond Cabot's 
outlines, the administration even committed itself to attend an 
economic conference which the Latin Americans had been requesting 
for years.2 5 
Cabot was both frustrated and relieved that he was being 
removed from office as the administration was finally accepting his 
Latin America policy. In a letter to his brother Tom he confided, 
"Now at long last they have in a final frenzy to prepare for this 
[Caracus] Conference adopted practically everything I have fought, 
bled and politically died for . . . Perhaps I should be pleased [about the 
dismissal], because I really don't think I would have stood the fights 
and frustrations much longer."26 
Although he had already been appointed as Ambassador to 
Sweden and resigned as Assistant Secretary for American Republic 
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Affairs, Cabot was asked to attend the Caracas Conference as special 
advisor to Secretary Dulles. According to Cabot, Dulles "came as the 
chief of delegation principally to ram through our resolution about 
communism in the hemisphere." Even with the administration's 
recently approved changes in Latin American policy as leverage, 
Dulles did not have an easy time gaining support for his anti¬ 
communist resolution. Halfway through the Conference an amended 
version of the resolution passed. Dulles immediately returned to 
Washington, leaving the Latin American delegations "open-mouthed, 
because they had numerous matters, notably economic, which they 
wanted, and expected, to discuss with him." In Cabot's opinion, 
Dulles' seemingly premature departure was "symptomatic of his 
disregard for our sister republics." "Being in no mood to assist any 
longer with the farce," Cabot soon followed Dulles back to 
Washington to prepare for his new post. Cabot arrived in Sweden in 
April, 1954 and spent three of the most enjoyable and least 
controversial years of his professional life as Ambassador to 
Sweden.27 
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CHAPTER 5 
Colombia: 1957 - 1959 
Cabot returned to Latin America in 1957, when he received an 
appointment as Ambassador to Colombia. Naturally he was excited 
and enthusiastic about returning to the region. Although the 
administration had belatedly accepted many of the programs he had 
advocated during his tenure as Assistant Secretary, Cabot still felt 
that the administration had no real Latin American policy. In his 
opinion, the administration addressed Latin American concerns only 
when outside factors forced its hand. Cabot hoped to use his new 
position to lobby for a new, comprehensive, long term Latin American 
policy. Before he could focus on revising United States policy, 
however, he had to deal with several immediate problems in 
Colombia. 
When Cabot arrived in June, the political situation in Colombia 
was in turmoil. Prior to 1953, Conservative President Laureano 
Gomez had been in power. His term in office was marked by "civil 
violence and guerrilla warfare," in which as many as 100,000 
Colombians had been killed. The Gomez presidency ended when 
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General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla assumed power in a bloodless coup 
d'etat. Rojas promised to restore peace and constitutional 
government to Colombia and, although to a large extent the violence 
subsided, Rojas showed no signs of restoring constitutional 
government. Less than one month before Cabot's appointment as 
Ambassador, Rojas had been forced out of office and replaced by an 
interim five man junta led by Major General Gabriel Pari's. When 
Cabot arrived plans were being made for nationwide elections 
designed to return Colombia to constitutional government, but there 
was still sporadic violence and the ever present threat of a coupJ 
The long period of civil strife plus the corruption of the Rojas 
government left the country deeply in debt and in a desperate 
economic condition. To exacerbate matters, the Colombian economy 
relied almost solely on coffee exports and coffee prices were then 
falling. Cabot described the near famine conditions which confronted 
him soon after his arrival in Bogota: 
At a meeting with outside relief agencies I learned that the food 
situation in Colombia was grimmer than I thought. CARE was 
feeding 1,200 families daily in Barranquila, the National 
Catholic Welfare was feeding 350,000-600,000 in the entire 
nation. The people of Colombia suffered from endemic 
malnutrition, with low protein, fat and calcium. Crops were 
short because of drought, poor seeds, lack of insecticides, 
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fertilizer, spare parts and the violence which devastated so 
much of the country, making people unwilling to try to 
grow crops or keep cattle. Topping all this off was the fact that 
prices were soaring so high that most Colombians simply could 
not afford to pay for their minimal nutritional needs.2 
Obviously the new Ambassador's first priority was to secure 
as much famine relief as possible. During the summer and fall, Cabot 
communicated with State Department, the Agriculture Department, 
the International Cooperation Administration as well as CARE and 
Catholic Relief Services urging all parties to provide all available 
relief. When Cabot's pleas failed to bring adequate relief, he 
reminded officials in Washington that continued instability would 
likely spell a return to a military dictatorship, or worse it could 
provide an opportunity for communist penetration. The Ambassador’s 
efforts eventually paid dividends. By 1958, American food relief was 
reaching ten per cent of Colombia's population each day and the 
immediate threat of famine diminished.3 
Cabot also became entangled in the country's ongoing 
religious struggle between the Catholic majority and the small 
Protestant minority. In a memorandum written on the scene, Cabot 
recalled his state department briefing before he left for Colombia 
where he was informed by the Secretary of State, and the Assistant 
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Secretary for Inter-American Affairs that "the religious question 
was the most important question which would claim my attention in 
Colombia and . . . that I should make vigorous efforts to solve it."4 
The problem, as the Department saw it, was discrimination 
against the Protestants in general, but specifically Protestants from 
the United States, then in Colombia. The government had officially 
closed Protestant churches, and Protestant schools. In some cases 
churches had been bombed and Protestant relief workers and 
missionaries had been persecuted. From the Colombian view, 
however, Washington was making a concerted effort to Protestantize 
the traditionally Catholic country, one more example of its forcing 
the North American way of life on a weaker country. As one 
Colombian Catholic Bishop put it, "I had understood that diplomats 
were to treat only of commercial and international matters and not 
to interfere in religious affairs," but "the United States Government, 
through its diplomatic corps is supporting Protestant propaganda in 
our country."5 
From the beginning Cabot anticipated resistance were he to 
press Protestant claims. He feared that, "a strong Catholic reaction 
90 
was probable in the event that I made vigorous representations," and 
that, "if the Catholic Church in Colombia did decide to oppose my 
representations in behalf of Protestants, it would enlist the support 
of the Catholic Church in the United States." Additionally, Cabot 
feared that involvement by the United States in the religious 
question might be considered undue interference in the internal 
affairs of the country and that it could jeopardize the ruling junta's 
attempts to restore constitutional government, leading to more 
division and violence at a time when the country desperately needed 
unification and peace.6 
Despite these apprehensions, Cabot followed instructions and 
became involved in the religious question immediately upon his 
arrival. The first written communication with Washington that he 
initialed was a report on Protestant churches that remained closed 
as a result of government action, and in his first meeting with 
Colombia's Foreign Minister Cabot received assurances that the 
government would address the question of religious discrimination, 
"within a month or two." At this juncture, Washington's protests 
were based on an 1846 treaty which gave the Embassy some legal 
basis for interfering on behalf of Americans who were being 
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persecuted. Since these protests had borne no fruit, Cabot proposed a 
tactical change in August 1957. Rather than citing the nineteenth 
century treaty as the legal basis for its protests, the Embassy should 
argue that the Colombian Constitution guaranteed both religious 
freedom and civil rights to foreigners. This tactic, however, proved 
to be no more successful because technically the constitution was 
suspended at the time and even if it were in effect, article 11 which 
provided that "Foreigners shall enjoy in Colombia the same civil 
rights as are conceded to Colombians," also added that the 
government may, "for reasons of public order, make the exercise of 
specific civil rights by foreigners subject to special conditions, or 
deny it."? 
By November 1957, Cabot was convinced that the United 
States was exceeding its authority in the religious question. Rather 
than simply protecting the rights of American citizens, Washington 
was attempting to "reestablish liberty of worship in general in 
Colombia," an act obviously beyond the scope of normal diplomatic 
procedures. Cabot expressed this thought to Assistant Secretary 
Richard Roy Rubottom, who rejected Cabot's arguments and urged him 
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to "continue to make vigorous representations."8 
Over the next several months, however, the Department's 
attitude began to shift. As Colombia's newly elected government was 
preparing to take office in July 1958, Cabot received new 
instructions: "Without receding from the strong position already 
taken ... it seems best at this time to relax our representations to 
the Colombians." This was the course Cabot had advocated from the 
start. Although he succeeded in convincing the Department to alter 
its policy, the strong pro-Protestant stance that he had been forced 
to take had resulted in a number of negative comments about Cabot 
in Colombia and in the Catholic press in the United States.9 
In the midst of his dealing with the political, economic and 
religious problems in Colombia, Cabot resumed his attempts to 
convince the administration of the need for an effective overall 
policy toward Latin America to replace the piecemeal policy or lack 
of policy which had prevailed in recent years. The work he was 
forced to abandon four years earlier when he left his position as 
Assistant Secretary for American Republic Affairs. Cabot realized 
that being ambassador to Colombia was not a strategic position from 
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which he might have direct impact on overall Latin American policy. 
Fortunately, he had an acquaintance who was in a position to have 
this type of impact. Once in Colombia, he resumed correspondence 
with the President's brother, Dr. Milton Eisenhower, who not only had 
access to the President, but who also was somewhat of a Latin 
American expert and for the most part sympathetic to Cabot's views. 
During Cabot's first winter in Colombia he exchanged letters 
with Dr. Eisenhower on an almost weekly basis. In this 
correspondence, the two men discussed the problems with and 
possible revisions in current policy. Both Cabot and Dr. Eisenhower 
agreed on the basic problem: owing to American commitments 
throughout the world and to the government's limited resources, 
Latin America was being neglected particularly in terms of United 
States aid available for economic development. Neither man was 
suggesting that the global fight against communism be jeopardized 
by diverting resources from other strategic areas to Latin America, 
but Cabot in particular argued that investment in Latin America was 
a key to winning the Cold War. In one of his first letters to Dr. 
Eisenhower, he pointed out that Washington's neglect of Latin 
America had given the Soviets "a heaven-sent opportunity to move 
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into this field with minimal costs and maximum opportunities."! 0 
Cabot's initial idea was to use money acquired from the sale 
of surplus commodities (under P.L. 480 of 1954) in other parts of the 
world for economic development in Latin America. Dr. Eisenhower 
agreed with this plan, at least in principle, because it would help 
Latin America without requiring any significant new funding from 
Washington. Dr. Eisenhower discussed Cabot's suggestion with people 
in the state department, but it soon became evident that too many 
roadblocks precluded a complex plan of this nature being put into 
effect. Dr. Eisenhower then informed Cabot that he had been thinking 
of a good will tour through Central America as a sequel to the one 
that they had taken together through South America in 1953. While 
Cabot favored the idea, he realized that for United States to 
formulate an effective policy something more substantial than a good 
will tour would be required.! 1 
In a letter dated January 24, Cabot's tone became much more 
urgent as Soviet trade representatives arrived in Colombia offering 
that government long term credits at very low interest rates, 
something the United States was not offering Bogota at the time. 
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Cabot concluded that "now there is every evidence that the Russians 
are going to do what they cheaply can to rock the boat for us in Latin 
America." He also reiterated his frustration with the lack of any 
long term strategy for the region lamenting, "I wish we would 
occasionally face challenges which can be foreseen before they are 
actually on us. In regard to the challenge of Latin America, it would 
seem to me that we would be wise to face it at this early date rather 
than to wait until it has acquired momentum."! 2 
A very sympathetic Dr. Eisenhower's replied "I agree that our 
relations with Latin America are degenerating, that Communists are 
taking advantage of every discontent they can, and that we must do 
something about it." He solicited Cabot's reaction to some ideas he 
had been contemplating. Recognizing that the American economy was 
then in a recession and that neither the President nor Congress was 
likely to request any new expenditures for the region, Dr. Eisenhower 
focused on two alternatives, neither of which would require much 
public money. One was to develop some type of new credit 
instrument to provide developmental loans. While this task would 
involve an initial United States expenditure it would be in the form 
of a loan rather than of a grant and consequently it would be more 
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palatable to the President and to Congress. The second alternative 
was to help the Latin American countries to avoid the all too common 
boom and bust cycles in their economies by somehow stabilizing 
prices of certain commodities. Because Dr. Eisenhower had only a 
very general idea of how either of these concepts might be 
implemented, he asked the ambassador, "Would it do any good for 
Secretary Dulles quietly to bring home the Ambassadors of all 
twenty Latin American countries . . . and ask them to pool their 
thinking in developing the best set of suggestions they can?"i3 
Cabot replied favorably although he had some reservations. 
While he certainly agreed that providing credit to the republics was 
important, he also recognized that "At the moment many of the Latin 
American countries are already staggering under their debt burdens," 
so credit alone would not solve the problem. As for price 
stabilization, Cabot wholeheartedly concurred that because so many 
countries in the region had single crop or single resource economies, 
there would never be long term economic development and political 
stability without some form of price stabilization. He also 
recognized, however, that any form of price stabilization was 
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"anathema to most thinking in our government."! 4 
Cabot felt that a meeting of ambassadors could generate 
some new ideas. Nevertheless, he had two very serious reservations. 
Acknowledging the complexity of the problems, Cabot knew that a 
brief meeting of chiefs of mission was not likely to produce a 
thoroughly new Latin American policy, that this innovation could only 
be accomplished "by prolonged sessions of a committee of experts." 
Moreover, Cabot felt if the proposed meeting were held it would no 
doubt draw a great deal of attention and probably raise expectations 
of Latin Americans who were still waiting for their Marshall Plan. 
Cabot favored a meeting, therefore, only if the administration were 
prepared to announce some type of new policy or program for Latin 
America. Otherwise he feared that the meeting would only lead to 
more frustration and resentment among the Latin American 
countries.! 5 
In February Dr. Eisenhower informed Cabot that his goodwill 
trip to Central America was being scheduled for the summer and that 
the proposed ambassador's meeting might be held in Panama at the 
conclusion of the trip. In his reply Cabot reiterated his previously 
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expressed apprehensions: 
Needless to say, a meeting in Panama at the end of your trip at 
which you and Secretary Dulles were present would be bound to 
get much publicity. This would be most helpful if we could 
come up fairly soon after the meeting with some program which 
would really fire the Latin American imagination. My 
apprehension is that, if we had no such program or if we were 
not willing to make the sacrifices which I am sure will be 
necessary if we are to execute such a program, the publicity 
would promptly boomerang.! 6 
Cabot also vented his growing pessimism regarding the 
likelihood or even possibility of any effective Latin American policy 
at the time; "I simply do not know given the many pressing demands 
on our Budget[sic], the recession which we continue to undergo, and 
the temper of the American Congress and people whether any 
significant program would be acceptable to the Administration and 
the Congress." In the same breath, he continued to warn that if 
Washington failed to act innovatively, it would be playing into the, 
"rather obvious Russian plans to infiltrate this area."! 7 
Cabot's warnings came at a time when the administration 
felt very secure in the belief that Latin America was in fact one of 
the few places in the world that were safe from an expansionistic 
communism. In November, 1957 Secretary Dulles had confidently 
assured journalists, "we see no likelihood at the present time of 
99 
communism getting into control of the political institutions of any 
of the American Republics." Even if, as Cabot had warned, Latin 
America were susceptible to communist appeals, early 1958 was a 
less than ideal time to try to convince the administration to counter 
the threat. President Eisenhower's approval rating had fallen to 
below fifty per cent, and the administration was dealing with a 
recession at home and a series of crises abroad—the Middle East, a 
standoff in Berlin, and potential war with mainland China. 
Undoubtedly, the last thing that President Eisenhower or Secretary 
Dulles wanted to hear was that they faced another urgent challenge, 
particularly in the one region which they assumed to be safe from 
communism.18 
Nevertheless, the Ambassador refused to give up although he 
altered his strategy. As Dr. Eisenhower prepared for his Central 
American trip, which would not include a regional meeting of chiefs 
of mission, his correspondence with Cabot was temporarily 
interrupted and Cabot used this opportunity to appeal directly to 
Secretary Dulles. Five years earlier, in his position as Assistant 
Secretary, Cabot had been instructed by Dulles to find one country 
which could be a "show case of what American economic cooperation 
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could do." At the time Cabot had declined because in his opinion 
there was no appropriate country which was not either "dictatorial," 
"corrupt," "unfriendly," or "hopelessly mismanaging their funds." To 
some extent the Department had been using Venezuela as its 
showcase, but the recent overthrow of dictator Perez Jimenez and 
the exposure of the widespread corruption and poverty during his 
regime made this less than an ideal prototype.! 9 
In a letter to Dulles in April, Cabot suggested Colombia as 
the new American show case, arguing that "we have in Colombia 
conditions which are perhaps as good as those we shall ever find to 
undertake such a program." He described the present Colombian 
government as "honest, able, patriotic and doing the best it can in 
very difficult circumstances." It is very likely that this suggestion 
was more an effort to secure desperately needed United States aid 
for Colombia than an actual attempt by Cabot to revive the 
secretary's scheme. Whatever Cabot's motives, he received no reply 
from Dulles and other events soon diverted his efforts.20 
Ironically, Cabot's efforts to call attention to the frustration 
and discord in Latin America were interrupted by preparations for 
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Vice President Richard Nixon's trip through South America, the very 
event which finally ended the administration's lethargy. Cabot was 
noticeably annoyed over spending much of the month of April 
preparing for the visit which he was certain had more to do with 
politics than with policy. Excerpts from two diary entries express 
the Ambassador's displeasure: 
April 10: Clearly the V.P. wants something so supercolossal 
that it will even wow the yokels back home in the election year. 
Being more concerned with our relations with Colombia, and 
with substance rather than show, I am slightly appalled . . . The 
details in the Department's instructions are appalling—the only 
thing they haven't asked for is an officer to see that the V.P.'s 
fly isn't unbuttoned. 
April 20: The press are to be treated like pampered Pekinese, 
and must get a preferential place in the cavalcade regardless of 
that putting other important officials . . . somewhere down 
among the teacups. It's to be a Hollywood supercolossal with 
the Embassy tagged with supplying the mobs for the mob scenes, 
which is all Nixon (or perhaps his staff) wants . . . it's going to 
be damned undignified.21 
Although perhaps a bit cynical, Cabot's remarks seem to be 
accurate based on some of the instructions that he received from 
Washington concerning guest lists and seating charts for receptions, 
organization of motorcades, and "the importance which must be 
attached to the United States press delegation."22 
While in the midst of dealing with the endless preparations 
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for the Vice President's visit, Cabot confronted another potential 
crisis. Just days before Nixon's arrival, Cabot was awakened in the 
middle of the night with news that a coup had broken out against the 
interim ruling junta. Fortunately, it was only a minor uprising to be 
smashed almost before he could get word to Washington that a coup 
had started. Colombia, which Nixon visited on May 12, turned out to 
be one of the few uneventful stops on Nixon's trip which saw the Vice 
President harassed in Motevideo, stoned in Lima, and assaulted by 
angry mobs in Caracas. While certainly unfortunate for Nixon and his 
entourage, the mistreatment of the Vice President proved to be a 
blessing for Cabot and the others within the government who had 
been urging a reversal of United States policy. "The effect of the 
unhappy Nixon trip was to spark a debate about the Latin American 
policy of the United States," something Cabot had been 
unsuccessfully attempting to do for more than five years.23 
This debate was not actually new, as Cabot, Dr. Eisenhower, 
Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs Rubottom and a few 
others had been discussing the issue for some time. The Nixon trip 
brought the debate into the forefront, however, and forced it upon the 
President, Secretary Dulles and others who were actually in a 
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position to change the policy. Another factor in this revived debate 
was Dr. Eisenbhower's trip through Central America which, despite 
some concern for his safety, proceeded as scheduled. Although there 
was no violence, the trip further convinced Dr. Eisenhower that he 
and the administration had been underestimating the amount of 
unrest in Latin America. He once again began to push for changes. In 
a preliminary report to the president Dr. Eisenhower pointed to an 
"imperative need for bankable loans . . . more stable relationship 
between raw commodity prices and the price of manufactured 
products," and "the urgent and immediate need to bring about 
throughout the hemisphere a clear accurate understanding of United 
States policies, purposes, programs, and capabilities."24 
The first fruit to emerge from this debate was that the 
United States would begin to distinguish between friendly 
dictatorships and democracy. As Nixon put it "a formal handshake for 
dictators; an embraso for leaders in freedom." Although this 
modification appeared to be a significant reversal, it may actually 
have been more a recognition of the fact that dictators throughout 
the area were being ousted in recent years.2 5 
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A second shift, Washington's backing of the new Inter- 
American Development Bank, was announced in August at a meeting 
of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council. Although Cabot 
had been advocating such action for five years, he was noticeably 
disturbed by the procedure and the proposed structure of the Bank. 
He took this occasion to renew his correspondence with Dr. 
Eisenhower and in the most blunt and critical tone he had ever used 
with the President's brother, he vented his disenchantment with the 
Bank in particular and Latin American policy in general.26 
Cabot's first complaint was that he and the other chiefs of 
mission had been given less than one day's notice before the public 
announcement of United States participation in an Inter-American 
Development Bank, hardly sufficient time to play up the importance 
to the Latin American leaders. Even worse, the day after this 
announcement, President Eisenhower notified the public of a new 
Middle East development plan. Cabot shared the view of many in 
Latin America that, "there was little evidence that our move was 
anything but a sop to Latin America while we attended to the Middle 
East." He added "It was announced at a relatively low level by 
comparison with the announcement of our policy in the Middle East, it 
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and as a result, "from what was certainly a constructive 
announcement, we ended up getting as much blame as 
commendation."27 
The proposed Bank itself drew Cabot’s ire as he charged that 
the proposed total investment of $600 million "is not remotely 
adequate to solve even the most pressing and essential economic 
problems of Latin America," and warned that when the details were 
released, "we shall be in for another major wave of resentment 
against the United States." Cabot further argued that there was no 
possible way that the debt ridden Latin American countries could 
come up with two thirds of this investment as had been suggested in 
the original outline. Reverting to a point he had articulated for 
years, Cabot complained, "I have the impression that we have had no 
policy for Latin America since the war ... all we have done is to feed 
them by nibbles as their demands became so strident that we felt 
something must be done." Cabot's growing frustration surfaced when 
he wrote that it might be better for the United States to "say no 
firmly" than to "again seem to throw a nibble."28 
Cabot warned anew that, "if we do not do more than what is 
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forced upon us, we are going to find that we increasingly lose control 
of the situation in Latin America." Before he closed he offered still 
another suggestion: that Washington carefully study the idea of a 
hemispheric common market. Although he discounted the likelihood 
of the idea being approved either in the United States or in many 
countries of Latin America, Cabot felt that the proposal itself might 
improve his country's image in the region. No hemispheric common 
market emerged, but the Eisenhower administration began to support 
regional economic associations, something that it had not previously 
done.29 
Following the Nixon visit, the Eisenhower administration 
adopted another initiative that Cabot had been urging for sometime. 
It decided to support commodity stabilization agreements, the most 
important of which was an international coffee agreement which was 
signed by fifteen Latin American countries in September, 1958. This 
agreement provided for each of the signatories to gradually reduce 
the amount of coffee they would produce each year, thus contributing 
significantly to economic stability in coffee producing countries.30 
In February 1959, President Eisenhower approved NSC 
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5902/1, which set forth the administration's new policy toward 
Latin America, positions Cabot had been advocating as far back as 
1953. According to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Snow, the 
principal change from previous policy 
may be summarized as greater recognition of the importance of 
Latin American attitudes, greater acceptance that Latin 
American economic development will require an additional flow 
of private and public capital from the United States and greater 
stress on cultural exchanges and informational activities. 
Recently adopted courses of action, such as the establishment 
of the Inter-American Bank, are recorder and greater flexibility 
is given in meeting critical economic problems.31 
Unquestionably by early 1959, the administration's Latin 
American policy had undergone considerable revision and that many 
of the changes reflected acceptance of the arguments that Cabot had 
been making for several years. Less clear is the role that Cabot's 
prodding actually played in this policy revision. In his study of Latin 
America, The Wine is Bitter, Dr. Eisenhower gives most of the credit 
for the new Latin American policy to three individuals within the 
State Department—Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs 
Douglas Dillon, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs 
Thomas C. Mann and Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs 
Rubottom. According to Dr. Eisenhower, "in 1958, Dillon, Mann and 
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Rubottom quickly recognized the need for changes in our policies. 
They began setting up commodity study groups . . . They agreed the 
time had come for us to take the lead in creating an Inter-American 
Bank," and "We all felt that the United States should begin promoting 
the development of common markets in Latin America." Dr. 
Eisenhower makes no mention of the fact that he had been discussing 
these very ideas in his correspondence with Cabot, an exchange begun 
months before these policy revisions were set in place.32 
The President in Waging Peace claims, "Some of these 
significant advances were a direct result of the appointment ... of 
my brother Milton as my personal representative and special 
ambassador on matters affecting Latin America." The President 
specifically notes the impression left in Dr. Eisenhower's report on 
his Central America trip of 1958 that, "time was running out in Latin 
America," the same message that for several months Cabot had been 
repeating to Dr. Eisenhower.33 
Stephen Rabe, in his book, Eisenhower and Latin America , 
gives perhaps the most balanced view of the change in policy. He 
singles out Dillon as its leading advocate within the administration, 
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but also credits Dr. Eisenhower with directly influencing the 
President, and the Nixon trip for forcing the issue on the President. 
Rabe also underscores that the two strongest opponents of a new 
Latin American policy over the years were no longer strategically 
placed to block change. Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey had 
resigned to be replaced by less rigid Robert Anderson, and Secretary 
of State Dulles then in poor health had lost some of the power he had 
enjoyed earlier.34 
Cabot himself, principally credits the change in policy to 
"others in the Department"(probably Dillon, Mann and Rubottom) who 
had "reached the same conclusion," that current Latin American 
policy was in serious need of revision. While he was corresponding 
with Dr. Eisenhower, they were "working to get something done." In 
truth, Cabot deserves more credit for the policy shift of 1958 than 
he has been given or even than he gave himself. While it is true that 
many factors contributed to the shift, it is also true that Cabot had 
been one of its first and strongest advocates. Whether indirectly by 
planting the seed in the minds of his many contacts in and out of the 
Department, or more directly through his extensive correspondence 
with Dr. Eisenhower at the very time that the latter renewed his 
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campaign for change, Cabot certainly contributed to the 
Administrations decision to revise its Latin American policy.35 
With these revisions in place, Cabot spent his remaining 
months in Colombia dealing with some of the now familiar problems. 
The Catholic-Protestant antagonism flared up again and the Catholic 
press continued its criticism of Cabot. This time he defended 
himself and American policy in a letter to the newspaper El 
Catolicismo . An effective ploy, the editor not only published the 
letter, but also issued “a mild reply" in which the newspaper declared 
the debate closed.36 
In October 1958, former dictator Rojas Pinilla had returned to 
the country. Again Cabot had to face the possibility of a coup until 
Colombian authorities imprisoned the ambitious politician, thus 
removing the threat and allowing the Ambassador to rest easier. 
During his last months in Colombia, Cabot conducted a series 
of public meetings throughout the country at which he answered 
questions raised by Colombian students and others who attended the 
sessions. He had launched this public relations experiment while the 
United States Ambassador to Sweden, and had won much praise for 
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the idea both in the United States and in Sweden. As in Sweden, he 
travelled to colleges or other appropriate assemblies there to field 
questions concerning American policy. Not only did this format 
provide him an opportunity to clarify misunderstandings of that 
policy, but it also educated the Ambassador as to the concerns, 
grievances and thoughts of the Colombian people, not to mention the 
fundamental problems of the region. Cabot later recalled that these 
meetings were "exceedingly useful." Most surprisingly he 
encountered, "no hostile demonstrations or heckling." The religious 
question which had elicited so much criticism from the press, was 
not even raised. These public forums continued as a Cabot trademark 
for the remainder of his career. Perhaps, subtly at least, they had a 
long term impact on Washington's relations with Latin America since 
he was often meeting with students, the future leaders of the 
respective countries.37 
In May 1959, Cabot learned that the ambassador to Brazil was 
leaving her post. As he later remembered it, "I had long yearned to be 
appointed Ambassador there. It was therefore a great pleasure to 
receive a telephone call . . . asking if I would accept the 
appointment."38 
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CHAPTER 6 
BRAZIL: 1959 - 1961 
When Cabot arrived in Brazil in July 1959, that country was not 
the tranquil tropical "paradise" that he remembered from his 
previous assignment there nearly a quarter of a century earlier. 
Instead, it was a rapidly developing country whose government was 
in the midst of a "heated dispute" with the State Department over 
economic policy. Cabot would spend the next two years trying to 
resolve several minor diplomatic disputes between the two countries 
while continuing to press for a more comprehensive long term Latin 
American policy. 1 
Cabot's primary challenge stemmed from Brazilian President 
Juscelino Kubitschek's plan to modernize Brazil under his slogan 
"fifty years of progress in five." Under Kubitschek, Brazil's economy 
had been growing rapidly, but at a price. Growth had been paid for by 
drastically increasing the amount of money in circulation, which led 
to spiralling inflation. Both the International Monetary Fund, (IMF) 
and the Export-Import Bank had extended loans to Brazil, but in 1959 
both creditors refused to make any additional loans until Brazil 
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"adopted more orthodox financial methods." Kubitschek feared that 
ending his inflationary practices would slow the development that 
the country was experiencing. He not only refused to change his 
economic policies, but he also became very critical of the United 
States for attempting to "dictate Brazil's financial policy." Although 
the feud between Kubitschek and the IMF would continue for more 
than a year, fortunately for Cabot, the most heated exchanges were 
over by the time he arrived.2 
After four months in Brazil, Cabot concluded, "There is no 
evidence that I can see that President Kubitschek has any real 
intention of economizing. On the contrary, his whole philosophy is 
one of all-out development and the hell with the economic 
consequences." Since it was apparent that Washington would fail in 
its efforts to stabilize Brazil's finances as long as Kubitschek was in 
office, the State Department could only console itself that 
Kubitschek's term as president would to expire in January 1961. 
With that thought in mind, Cabot suggested, "Our present concern 
should be to get through the next fourteen months with as little 
damage as possible to Brazil's economy and development, and to the 
relations between the two countries."3 
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Encouraging his colleagues to get "through the next fourteen 
months" was only short term. Thinking beyond the short term, Cabot 
made a series of recommendations to Assistant Secretary of State 
for Inter-American Affairs Rubottom which would effect long term 
relations with Brazil. One recommendation which he had been making 
since the first days of the Eisenhower administration was that the 
president visit Latin America. He also suggested that Secretary of 
State Christian Herter, who had succeeded the dying Dulles "should 
visit Brazil at an early opportunity and not repeat Acheson's and 
Dulles' mistake of waiting too long." In Cabot's opinion these visits 
as well as any similar gestures would be very beneficial since the 
Brazilians "yearn to be considered a great power, and they feel we 
have treated them on a par with Honduras."4 
However important the public relations gestures might be, 
Cabot felt the United States should change the substance of much of 
its current policy toward the country. He suggested that the new 
Inter-American Development Bank provide a loan to the Brazilian 
national oil company, Petrobras, that P.L. 480 funds grants rather 
than loans, that the United States increase sugar imports from 
Brazil, that his country cooperate with Brazil on a scientific study to 
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find all possible uses for coffee, and that the United States increase 
the amount of technical and health care assistance.5 
Additionally, Cabot proposed that Washington should find out 
more about Operacao Panamericana (OPA) and if it were truly 
realistic, the United States should support it. OPA was the name 
given to a vague cooperative plan for developing Latin America 
devised by Augusto Federico Schmidt, a close advisor to President 
Kubitschek. Cabot met with Schmidt several times, but "never was 
able to pin him down as to what he meant by Operacao Panamericana." 
The Brazilians continued to talk about OPA and, in fact, President 
Eisenhower publicly praised the idea during his visit to Brazil. 
Unfortunately it turned out to be more of a slogan than an actual 
program and Cabot finally concluded that Schmidt was "a poet rather 
than an expert in development.'^ 
Soon after forwarding these recommendations, Cabot 
received word that the President would finally visit South America 
and to be accompanied by the Secretary of State, the Assistant 
Secretary for Latin American Affairs, Rubottom, and members of the 
recently formed Advisory Committee on Inter-American Affairs 
which included, among others, the President's brother Milton 
119 
Eisenhower. 
While making preparations for the President's visit, Cabot 
received a reply to the recommendations he had made to Assistant 
Secretary Rubottom. The Assistant Secretary informed Cabot that a 
loan to Petrobras would not be feasible, but that funds for "sound 
development loans" would be available and the idea that P.L. 480 
profits be grants rather than loans would be studied. The Assistant 
Secretary also asked for additional information on OPA, but made no 
specific response to Cabot's other recommendations. In conclusion 
the Assistant Secretary admitted, "I have the impression that I have 
left more unsaid than said ... I hope to go over this orally with you 
and I feel this will be more productive than anything I can write."7 
The President visited Argentina, Brazil, Chili, and Uruguay 
during his trip, spending February 23-26 in Brazil. Cabot faced the 
same type of organizational problems that had confronted him during 
the Nixon visit two years earlier, and there were some logistical 
difficulties, particularly with the President's visit to the new inland 
Brazilian capital of Brasilia. Kubitschek arrived late, a car accident 
occurred in the motorcade, and it poured rain throughout an open car 
motorcade. An airplane crash, moreover, killed several members of 
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the United States Navy band which was to play for one of the 
receptions. Nevertheless the President was extremely well received 
in Brazil and in the other countries. Enthusiastic crowds greeted the 
President at every stop with no hint of the type of trouble Nixon had 
experienced on his visit. The closest thing to a protest that 
Eisenhower experienced was a letter he received from a student 
organization in Chili which very politely pointed out errors in United 
States policy, and a few signs that proclaimed "We like Ike; We like 
Fidel too"8 
However little Eisenhower's trip resembled Nixon's, like the 
Vice President's jaunt, it constituted a turning point for the 
Eisenhower administration. The new emphasis on Latin America 
begun after the Nixon visit in 1958 with such programs as the Inter- 
American Development Bank and commodity stabilization 
agreements, was completed in the months following the president's 
South America trip. The most significant change in policy came with 
the July announcement of the Social Progress Trust Fund, an 
economic aid program which had been sought for so long by the Latin 
Americans. The administration also announced it would increase 
funding for the Inter-American Development Bank. These two 
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announcements signified that the administration "had radically 
changed its view on what fostered communism in Latin America." 
The administration seemed finally to be agreeing with Cabot who for 
years had been arguing that the best way to fight communism was to 
improve the social and economic conditions of the people rather than 
simply backing any staunchly anti-communist government.9 
This new emphasis saw too, the administration's favoring 
"reform-minded politicians, educators, and military officers." It 
pledged $10 million to help launch the Central American Common 
Market, it expanded a student-exchange program, and it announced "a 
more flexible attitude on commodity agreements." Another Inter- 
American economic conference was held in Bogota in September. 
This time the United States delegation actually had something 
concrete to offer its neighbors, and "for the first time in the postwar 
period, United States diplomats enjoyed convening with Latin 
Americans"! 0 The meeting produced the Act of Bogota which pointed 
out the need "to modernize and improve the existing legal and 
institutional framework to ensure better conditions of land tenure, 
extend more adequate credit facilities and provide increased 
incentives in the land tax structure." The act also called for a re- 
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examination of "the equity and effectiveness of existing tax 
schedules and collection procedures." With the exception of the 
specific mention of tax equity, the Act of Bogota sounded similar to 
past rhetoric. The difference was that now Washington appeared 
prepared to implement this rhetoric with money, something it had 
been very reluctant to do in the past.i i 
Although at the time few people seemed to recognize it, the 
administration's new approach was, in fact, a change in the 
fundamental United States policy toward Latin America. Non¬ 
intervention, which had been the foundation of the Good Neighbor 
Policy, had been replaced by collective intervention. Rather than 
military intervention, however, the as yet unnamed policy was 
characterized by economic intervention primarily through the Social 
Progress Trust Fund and the Inter-American Development Bank. The 
administration had not only replaced the Good Neighbor Policy, it had 
in effect established the "foundation for the Alliance for 
Progress"!2 
Both the President and Dr. Eisenhower argued that this 
fundamental change was simply a logical conclusion to the 
evolutionary process Latin American policy had been undergoing for 
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more than two years. The catalyst was the trip to South America 
where the President suddenly realized that the current United States 
policy "had failed to benefit the masses" and that "the demand for 
social justice was still rising." As Dr. Eisenhower explained, the 
President "had seen enough to convince him that the choice was 
between rapid peaceful action and violent revolution, between reform 
in freedom and dangerous moves toward Communist dictatorships." 
Ironically, such language paralleled nearly verbatim the arguments 
advanced by Cabot in his "Evolution or Revolution" speech and in his 
letters to Dr. EisenhowerJ 3 
Although both the President and Dr. Eisenhower went to great 
lengths to deny it, Castro's activities in Cuba had a great deal to do 
with the sudden policy reversal of 1960, as Cabot argued. Fidel 
Castro, who had overthrown Fulgencio Batista in 1959, was now 
forcing the Washington to act. Originally Castro's movement may or 
may not have been communist, but by early 1960, Castro's Cuba "had 
been abruptly transformed from a client of the United States into a 
radical bitterly Anti-American nation." In the wake of this "Castro- 
Communist challenge," the administration was finally forced to 
accept what Cabot had been warning them of for years that social, 
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political, and economic conditions in Latin America combined with 
Washington's neglect of the region were providing the Soviets with "a 
heaven-sent opportunity to move into this field with minimal costs 
and maximum opportunities." To remove this "heaven-sent 
opportunity," and "to prevent radicalism from spreading, it had to 
underwrite a thoroughgoing reform of Latin America's political, 
social, and economic institutions." In his diary, Cabot revealed 
ambivalence to what he considered a very tardy change in policy 
motivated by the wrong reasons:! 4 
I could laugh and I could weep. After seven years the 
administration is doing what I have been arguing for all these 
years--and has accepted the basic reasoning (evolution or 
revolution) for my stand. But Fidel has done it! What a crass 
undignified performance on our part! We move only when we 
have to consider the hemispheric repercussions of our row with 
Cuba—a point which will not be lost in L[atin] A[merican] ... I 
am appalled at the confusion re L[atin] A[merican] policy 
evidently no one had thought through what needed doing when the 
Cuban firecracker exploded, as was inevitable; now a program is 
being hastily improvised.l 5 
As Cabot pointed out, the administration had indeed accepted 
nearly everything that he had been proposing since his days as 
Assistant Secretary. While conversion to the Cabot tenet should 
have, and apparently did please him, frustration and bitterness were 
also present, because of the path followed by the administration. 
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Rather than actively developing a sound, well conceived, long term 
strategy toward Latin America because that would be the right thing 
to do for both Latin America and for the United States, it was 
continuing the practice of reacting to events as they arose. 
In late 1960, as Cabot neared the end of his Latin American 
career, he had every reason to be optimistic about Brazil's, as well 
as the Western Hemisphere's future. Although he had received 
virtually no credit for it, the official policy of the government 
reflected much of what he had been advocating. Kubitschek with 
whom Cabot had experienced his share of disagreements, had been 
replaced in the recent Brazilian elections, and following the 
presidential elections in the United States, Cabot was further 
"encouraged by [Kennedy's] promises to do something about our 
relations with Latin America." Cabot enjoyed relative peace and 
tranquility during his last months in Latin America, travelling to 
various parts of Brazil which he had not previously visited and 
holding several of his now familiar public forums with Brazilian 
students."* 6 
Of course, a few developments marred the tranquil picture. 
The newly elected Brazilian President, Janio Quadros, proved to be 
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much less cooperative than Cabot had hoped. Quadros decided that 
Brazil should end its traditional Cold War alignment with the United 
States and pursue an independent foreign policy which would include 
cultivating relations with Soviet bloc countries. Yet he still sought 
economic aid from Washington. Cabot saw this maneuver as a blatant 
effort to blackmail the United States into giving him aid in return for 
his loyalty in the Cold War. The Ambassador warned, therefore, that 
yielding to this kind of pressure would lead to similar problems in 
the future.17 
The new Kennedy administration did not heed Cabot's warning. 
In February, Adolph A. Berle Jr. arrived in Brazil prepared to offer a 
$100 million loan if Brazil would support Washington's anti-Castro 
position. Quadros refused the $100 million and countered with what 
Cabot called a request for "everything including the kitchen sink, not 
to mention an ice box, deep freeze, washing machine and hair 
curlers." The Berle mission failed, but the administration 
persevered. In early April Douglas Dillon, the new Secretary of the 
Treasury, arrived in Brazil and despite Cabot's efforts to dissuade 
him, negotiated an arrangement which featured a "huge rescheduling 
of debts" along with a large influx of new economic aid from a 
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variety of sources. It is ironic that after arguing for so many years 
about the need for increased aid, Cabot's final stand was his 
opposition to providing aid to Brazil. The question was not Brazil's 
financial needs, for as Cabot admitted, "The finances of Brazil could 
scarcely be in a worse mess." Rather it was the process followed by 
the administration in reaching the decision. Not part of a long range 
plan, the aid came as a last resort to obtain Brazilian support for the 
Bay of Pigs invasion which was only days away. As Cabot put it, 
"Quadros had once again proved that the way to get things from Uncle 
Sam is to kick him in the shins."! 8 
Cabot’s assessment proved to be accurate as Quadros continued 
to snub the United States, first by welcoming Cuban revolutionary 
hero Che Guevara just days after Dillon's departure, and later that 
month by denouncing the Bay of Pigs invasion. The recommendation 
against aid to Quadros was Cabot's last attempt to influence a 
decision affecting Latin America. In May, he returned to Washington 
on leave and there found out that he was being replaced as 
Ambassador to Brazil. Because the new Ambassador, Lincoln Gordon, 
did not want to take office until October, Cabot had to return to 
Brazil for a short time but found that there was little to do as a lame 
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duck Ambassador. 
After an extended leave following his return from Brazil, 
Cabot assumed his last diplomatic post when he became Ambassador 
to Poland in 1962. After serving three years in Poland Cabot 
returned to Washington where he served as Deputy Commandant of 
the National War College for one year before retiring after 40 years 
in the Foreign Service. During his retirement Cabot continued to 
write articles on various aspects of diplomacy as well as a book 
entitled First Line of Defense in which he reminisced about his 
career and diplomacy in general. Cabot also taught briefly at the 
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He died on February 24, 1981 
in Washington D.C.19 
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CONCLUSIONS 
During the four decades that he spent in the Foreign Service, 
John Moors Cabot had a positive and lasting impact on Latin 
American relations. At times he received more than his share of 
criticism. He was "fired" from the most influential position he ever 
held. He endured repeated frustrations in his many attempts to 
change policy. Nevertheless, he consistently and vigorously 
defended his positions, he unceasingly sought solutions to the 
problems he encountered, and most important he incessantly studied 
alternatives and proposed solutions. He worked hard to become 
fluent in both Spanish and Portuguese, and took the time to learn 
about the local cultures of the areas where he was assigned. 
Through his innovative public forums and other contacts, he came to 
understand the wants and needs of the local people. Moreover, he 
was not reluctant to capitalize on his many contacts in the 
government as he tried to improve Washington's relations with its 
southern neighbors. 
Early in his career, when not yet in a position to have a great 
impact on official relations, Cabot worked to establish the Maria 
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Moors Cabot award which encouraged better relations through better 
media coverage. During World War II he improved Latin American 
relations by criticizing Britain during the Belize dispute, and by 
sympathizing with Latin concerns at the international conferences 
he attended. Immediately after the war, although he was unjustly 
criticized for his efforts, Cabot actually worked behind the scenes 
to prevent American interference in Argentine politics. As 
Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs he was 
one of the first to argue that Washington's policies were neglecting 
Latin America in favor of new found friends and even ex-enemies, an 
argument which may have cost him his job. As Ambassador to both 
Colombia and Brazil he perceived that American policy was failing 
and that by favoring the established elites of Latin American 
countries while neglecting the needed social reform and economic 
development Washington was actually providing a "heaven-sent 
opportunity" for communist infiltration. Long before Castro's 
Revolution in Cuba, Cabot had warned that social change was coming, 
either by "evolution or revolution."! 
It is difficult to ascertain exactly what impact Cabot had on 
the Eisenhower administration's Latin American policy. There is no 
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conclusive evidence that he ever directly altered policy. On the 
other hand, the administration, on more than one occasion, did adopt 
policies for which Cabot had been lobbying. Thus it appears that 
Cabot did influence policy decisions. This influence, however, was 
predominantly an indirect one exerted through his contacts in the 
State Department and, more importantly, through his relationship 
with Milton Eisenhower. 
Cabot understood how important Latin America was to the 
United States. He appreciated the complexity of the problems 
affecting that relationship and that their solution was essential if 
the United States were really to enjoy good hemispheric relations. 
He also understood, however, that his country's resources were 
limited; yet even if resources were unlimited, he knew that 
ultimately only Latin American's themselves could solve these 
problems. The United States could only provide assistance, which in 
his opinion it should do. 
In addition to the major effects on policy discussed above, 
there were countless other times that Cabot subtly improved 
relations between the United States and Latin America simply by 
paying attention to what the Latin Americans were saying or by 
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caring enough to find out what problems actually existed. At times 
it might seem as if Cabot favored Latin American interests over 
those of the United States. A closer examination, however, shows 
that nothing could be farther from the truth. Cabot had a strong 
belief that "The first line of defense of any country is not the 
military strength," but "diplomatic representatives abroad, who 
must do everything in their power to see that our relationships are 
favorable." For nearly forty years, Cabot was in the "first line of 
defense," and in these years he did nothing to jeopardize the 
interests of his country. He was simply one of the few to recognize, 
particularly during the 1950s, that what was best for Latin America 
was, in the long run, what was best for the United States.2 
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ENDNOTES 
1. Cabot to Dr. Eisenhower, 24 January 1958, reel #2, folder 
74, Cabot Papers; Cabot speech before joint meeting of Export 
Manager's Club and Export Advertising Association, Statler Hotel, 
New York City, 17 March 1953, reel #14, folder 49, Cabot Papers. 
2. Cabot, First Line of Defense, ix. 
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